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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) : 
Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be 
paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, 
and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of 
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in 
this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and 
medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this 
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance 
carrier and not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1993): 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, 
from lengthening or shortening any time period pre-
scribed in this chapter, except those time periods 
established for judicial review. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b): 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice 
given thereunder or by order of the court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its 
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order 
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before 
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or 
as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made 
after the expiration of the specified period permit the 
act to be done where the failure to act was the result 
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time 
for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), 
(d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the 
extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Did the Board of Review correctly determine that Mr. 
Judd's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment? 
2) Did the Industrial Commission err in permitting Mr. Judd 
to file his Motion for Review one month late? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1) The Board of Review's application of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
35-1-45 (1988) to the facts of this case is subject to correction 
of error by this Court. King v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 850 
P.2d 1281, 1292 (Utah App. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(d) (1988). 
2) The Board of Review's decision to allow Mr. Judd an 
extra month to file his Motion for Review is subject to an abuse 
of discretion review. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AT ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL 
1) The first issue was raised at R. 86-182. 
2) The second issue was raised at R. 31-33. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Commercial Carriers employs Appellee Ronny Lynn 
Judd as a truck driver. (R. 19; Addendum 1). In May 1992 Mr. 
Judd and a co-employee, Mr. Coyle, were assigned to drive two 
trucks loaded with new automobiles from Missouri to California. 
(R. 19-2 0; Addendum 1). Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle left Missouri the 
morning of May 21 and stopped at Fort Kearney, Nebraska, for the 
night. (R. 20; Addendum 1). 
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle arrived in Fort Kearney at approxi-
mately 6:30 p.m. (R. 2, 50; Addendum 1). Their driver's logs 
indicate that they logged off work at this time; company policy 
provided that drivers who logged off were not on duty and were 
not under any responsibility to perform their employment 
activities. (R. 26; Addendum 1). They registered at a motel, 
parked their trucks next to each other in the parking lot, and 
proceeded to the motel's lounge where they began consuming 
alcohol.1 (R. 22; Addendum 1). Although employees of Commercial 
Carriers were not permitted to drink alcohol while on duty, they 
could choose to drink while off duty. (R. 12 8; Addendum 2). 
While at the lounge Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle noticed two 
young men harassing two women. (R. 22; Addendum 1). Mr. Judd 
*By the time they left the lounge, Mr. Coyle and Mr. Judd 
drank so much that Judge Allen found their judgment was "severely 
impaired." (R. 28; Addendum 1). Indeed, by the next morning, 
Mr. Judd's blood alcohol level had dropped to .18, still more 
than twice the legal limit in Utah. (R. 22; Addendum 1). 
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realized that he knew the older of the two women and invited her 
and her companion over to his table so they could avoid the two 
harassing men. (R. 22; Addendum 1). Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle 
remained at the lounge with the two women until it closed at 
midnight, then walked to the motel lobby with them. (R. 23; 
Addendum 1). 
The two young men appeared in the motel lobby a few minutes 
later and asked Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle for the first time if they 
could take one of the cars on their trucks for a joyride. 
(R. 22-3; Addendum 1). Mr. Judd told them that they could not 
and that all cars were equipped with alarms. (R. 23; Addendum 
1). After conversing with the foursome, the two young men left 
the lobby and walked out into the parking lot. (R. 23; Addendum 
1) . 
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle walked the two women to their car in 
the parking lot. (R. 23; Addendum 1). After Mr. Judd engaged in 
a kissing session with the older woman, the women drove off. 
(R. 23; Addendum 1). Some minutes later, upon returning from a 
convenience store down the road, Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle observed 
the two young men wandering in a field adjacent to the parking 
lot, then returning to the parking lot to walk around the cars 
and trucks parked there. (R. 23; Addendum 1). As the two young 
men walked between Mr. Coyle's truck and another truck, Mr. Coyle 
heard one of the men say that these must be the vehicles with the 
alarms. (R. 24; Addendum 1). Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle then 
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stepped out r i . ;M rhi- shadows wherf- t" h^y l-v: ^ -'^ observing the 
t " ? 'icks and all. 
other U u a ^ n ne marking s ' Addenda 1 and 5). 
The two you no Tr-,n ran away intr the fieiu. IK.. * M-raum 
1) . Al -"> two men wer^ su111 -^ ient .1 y 
"scared oft-! D^ * r:is point, he an: '- Coyle nonetheless took i t 
upon themselves *^ r r<~-u- *~l>^ riv^ for a full thirty yards :i nto 
t • • • . . Commercial Carriers does not 
hold employees responsible for vandalism that occurs to the 
trucks while eirn'^r--F; are off duty. (R. 165; Addendi iin, 2 ) . 
H -. • • .:. .. wnen vandalism occurs to tiia ks w m l ^ 
employees are ••', *: " Commercial Cani^-is r . viaer employees 
with specific 4n:~.r— ' :«'^r J ~ - le 
c jiupa ^ . •., . L. , x i.j j._xiw,.•, -.nip i oyees a i e uui. 
instructed to pursue vandals. (R. 25; Addendum 2 ) . 
After beir • u.r» ' '""/h , tin yi.ung mt»n 
stopped, ana or- . - .; L.-egaii beating •- Ji ldd with an undeter-
mined blunt object, -, ausing severe injury (R. 25; Addendim L 1 ) . 
When C«~ "r-.< . » . : . . K • • • • j n idd's i: equest for 
workmens' compensate , . benefits, Mi. uJuaa pet: tioned the 
Industrial Commissioi, for a hearina. Th^ \v +\\v\*\ WH-; held before 
Judge Allen on .. .-.--<:' 
demeanor at fr^.i
 :ir issessing t h e n credibility a^ ; - A..en 
entered a factual fin H u g that th^ f iah*" he* w^^n M1 Judd and the 
• "u :••-•- : ^  - - , :dendum 1) 
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Judge Allen discredited testimony to the effect that the assault 
arose out of Mr. Judd's efforts to protect his truck and its 
cargo from harm. (R. 26; Addendum 1). 
Additionally, Judge Allen noted that Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle 
"had for all intents and purposes appointed themselves a parking 
lot police department" when they warned the two young men to stay 
away from all vehicles in the lot. (R. 28; Addendum 1). Judge 
Allen observed that by pursuing the two men into the field after 
they tried to run away, Mr. Judd tried to take the law into his 
own hands and "deviated completely" from any possible course and 
scope of employment. (R. 28; Addendum 1). Judge Allen further 
noted that Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle had logged off duty at 6:30 
p.m., when they arrived in Fort Kearney. Commercial Carriers' 
Driver's Handbook states that off-duty employees were not respon-
sible for performing work. Once Mr. Judd logged off, he was on 
his own time. (R. 27; Addendum 1). Accordingly, Judge Allen 
denied Mr. Judd workmens' compensation benefits. 
Although Mr. Judd had thirty days from the entry of Judge 
Allen's order to file a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission, on the twenty-ninth day he filed what appeared to be 
a request for an extension in which to file a Motion for Review. 
Entitled "Motion for Continence[sic] for Response to Appeal," the 
request asked for a thirty-day extension without offering any 
explanation for the delay. (R. 29; Addendum 3). Commercial 
Carriers filed an objection to Mr. Judd's Motion for 
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C o n t i n e n c e fsic j r i v e d a y s l a t ^ r , p o i ' i M n a ••'.•• - h v M r , J u d d 
f ! • • >-.M ' -i.- . s required 
tv :ji. iii jfj 1^ ii; Addendum Nonetheless, ' idd 
received . .n rt"v-da-' extension and finally filed his Motion for 
The Board J: Review reversed Judge Allen's decision on March 
1 "i '-i4 • r, : ' H de-- IPKJII, tlip Board accepted uun^ All-"1"-.' :? 
d" !: ' • •• ' -v '^ i.sputed faci- " 
Addendum Nonetheless '.^ Board claimed ; hat ,* nad drawn 
different inferences from *-}*- tacts Liian haa Ji A ! ' n. 
P.i]- t : .-i. - .• i. -j without any ^p'iaiiai, .jn whatsoever 
that "the Commission finds ;•.'• basis to conclude that Judd's 
beati'i'i w~^- ' V •• I'-T-^fh ot a uisrn*-- ".• 
Proceeding on i*. s bald assumption that the fight resulted 
from,,. Mr Juid's effort 7 ' - .e 
Liiicks, Ln-- Soard COP> . , ^ C U Lnat M L , jadd'- .i.;uiies arose out ^ f 
his employmerr ; 4: Addendum ^ S . Howpver, the Board also 
maintained that t • . -
gociism,, "it was st . . : .os-jiy e m angled" wi; .. Mi', sudd's work as 
a truck, drivei 1 I' , l>4; Addendum, 5) „ 
:
 'The Board criticizes Judge Allen's factual finding, stating 
that "there is no objective evidence to support it," (R. 54; 
Addendum 5). Curiously, the Board offers no evidence to support 
its notion that the fight arose from Mr. Judd's efforts to 
protect his truck. 
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The Board next determined that Mr. Judd's injuries arose in 
the course of his employment because Mr. Judd was "a truck driver 
on assignment" and because he supposedly checked his truck some 
time before the assault occurred. (R. 54; Addendum 5). Although 
the Board admitted that Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle had arrived in 
Fort Kearney at 6:30 p.m., it ignored Judge Allen's factual find-
ing that they had logged off at this time and were thus off-duty. 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
Commercial Carriers accepts Judge Allen's findings of fact. 
The Board adopted Judge Allen's findings with two notable excep-
tions. First, the Board found that Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle had 
checked their trucks some time before the fight began, but Judge 
Allen made no finding to this effect. (R. 52; Addendum 5). 
Second, the Board rejected Judge Allen's finding that the reason 
for the fight was personal antagonism and substituted its own 
inference that the fight arose from Mr. Judd's efforts to protect 
his truck. 
Since these two exceptions are the only factual finding that 
Commercial Carriers disputes, Commercial Carriers ostensibly must 
marshal evidence in support of them. However, there is no evi-
dentiary basis in the record for the Board's finding that Mr. 
Judd checked his truck. Judge Allen did not make this finding in 
his order, and Mr. Judd did not testify that he checked his truck 
before going to the convenience store. (R. 110; Addendum 2). It 
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is impossible for Commercial Carriers to marshal non-existent 
evidence u 
Regarding the Board's second exception to Judge Allen's 
findings of far-- rh>- Board's statement that "the fight resulted 
f keep the other men away from 
the trucks" is conci<sory; the Board does not explain why it has 
reached this inference and a^r,s nof offer any evidence to si lpport 
the inference, ( i .^ : i.:-: . . 
When, a.n agency tails to disclose the evidence or "logio 
might: have employed, in making a lactual f_ e 
6ividHiii.n- .•-..'juiH:. ile. See Woodward v. Edzzio, a*. j> r .2d -* /4 
(Utah App. 19 91 •; findings must: include c-no-.i 01 subs, liary facts 
to show clearly the evidence :e 
iiKJisliaiiing oriort is inettectaai. ; Adams v. Board of Review of 
Indus. Comm'n. , 821 I a 2d ] oji.it; Auo :•*'• +acruai findings 
should be suffi 
ultimate fantiio ^n, .^sions are leachea; ao — ot adequc; •*- : • 
ings, appellant * . shi nq :. challenge agency' . ^^-'i., findings 
cannot marsh" --^  ^ • i <n-
ation whatsoever .hd\ .,, * n^% e iw diaw u. opposite inference 
from Judge Allen, It made n- ^tt^mpt 4 describe why its infer-
ence might t - t jtj, > A | leu's. 
Because the Board did not mention what subsidiary facts, if any, 
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it used to reach its inference, Commercial Carriers cannot mar-
shal evidence in support of this inference.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I; In concluding that Mr. Judd's injuries arose out of his 
employment, the Board of Review committed reversible error. 
Primarily, the Board failed to support with substantial evidence 
its assertion that the fight resulted from Mr. Judd's efforts to 
protect his truck. Additionally, the Board's suggestion that the 
fight still would have arisen out of Mr. Judd's employment if the 
fight was due to personal antagonism is legally insupportable. 
The Board committed reversible error by concluding that the 
fight arose in the course of Mr. Judd's employment, as well. It 
is undisputed that Mr. Judd was off-duty at the time of the 
fight. 
POINT II: The Board abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Judd 
to file an untimely Motion for Review because Mr. Judd did not 
show cause for an extension to file as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l(9) (1988) and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
6(b) . 
Commercial Carriers argues below that this Court can reject 
the Board's inference because it is not supported by substantial 
evidence. Because the substantial evidence standard requires 
this Court to examine the record as a whole, Commercial Carriers 
will lay out below all subsidiary facts in the record that the 
Board conceivably might have relied upon in reaching its 
inference. 
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ARGUMENT 
1 »OINT I 
THE BOARD INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT MR. JUDD'S 
TRIES AROSE OUT OF *-"~ T1kT THF, COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
A. The Board Erred In Concluding That The Injuries Arose 
GuL of Mr. Judd's Employment. 
1 BECAUSE THE BOARD FAILED TO EXPLAIN WHY IT-
REACHED ITS INFERENCE REGARDING THE CAUSE OF 
THE FIGHT, THE INFERENCE IS UNSIJPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Aware of the tenet of workinens' ronipensai; i cn\ l.-iw 
f •: . . . . iseTy entangled" wiLii the employee ^ work, in 
order 4 : -aise our o' the employment, i'R, 53), the Board 
endeavored to ~ : 1 M i . 1 i in in I i i q l i l i n l l i i i ; 1 "hi h i , 
Boar d rejected Judy*;* Allen's finding that the fight arose due •, • 
personal antagonism, and substituted its own inference that t he 
fieri -^- r-^-\ '• 
tie Budra u,.; x^j jai.. w, ..i». . eaciiec m opposite infer-
ence from Judge Allen, nor d:i d It: mention any evidence on which 
ij !::1 ] :i s :i i if erei ice . 
,:...o ^^uii ^auri. susiain the Board's factual inference 
Uii'les,c- , : :-: support?-.i r?v substantial evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 
6. •' ';1 ' = • • evidence standar d 
requires this Cui, >. •. - examine the i ecord as a whole, weighing 
4Judge Allen characterizes the reason behind the fight as a 
factual finding (R. 26)# but the Board terms the reason behind 
the fight as an inference. (R. 53). The characterization is not 
important, as the Board's inference is factual in nature and 
constitutes a finding of fact. 
11 
evidence that both supports and detracts from the finding. Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). 
The only way to present evidence that might suggest the 
fight arose over Mr. Judd's efforts to protect his truck is to 
isolate the events that occurred after Mr. Judd left the motel 
lounge, because this is the only time during the entire evening 
that trucks were even mentioned. The evidence from this snippet 
of time indicates that the young men asked Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle 
sometime after midnight if they could take one of the cars on the 
trucks for a joyride. (R. 23). Mr. Judd advised them that they 
could not and that the cars had alarms. (R. 23). Mr. Judd and 
Mr. Coyle later observed the young men milling about the parking 
lot where the trucks and several other vehicles were parked. (R. 
24). When they approached Mr. Coyle's truck and remarked that 
the cars had alarms Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle warned them to stay 
away from their trucks and all other vehicles in the parking lot. 
(R. 24). 
On the other hand, if one considers the totality of the 
evidence, as did Judge Allen, it is apparent that the fight arose 
over personal antagonism that had been developing over the course 
of the evening. The evidence from the record as a whole esta-
blishes as an initial matter that Mr. Judd's testimony at the 
hearing often contrasted sharply with his earlier deposition 
testimony and could not withstand cross examination. (R. 20-28). 
Mr. Coyle's testimony at the hearing was also a different version 
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of events from that contained in his police statement. (R. 24-
5)• Upon observing the demeanor and credibility of Mr. Judd and 
Mr. Coyle at the hearing, Judge Allen had trouble believing Mr. 
Judd's account that he had been trying to protect his truck from 
vandalism. (R. 26) . 
Instead, Judge Allen drew from ample evidence in finding 
that the fight resulted from personal antagonism between Mr. Judd 
and Mr. Coyle and the young men. Earlier in the evening Mr. Judd 
and Mr. Coyle had whisked two women away from the unwanted atten-
tions of the young men at the motel lounge. (R. 22). They 
stayed in the lounge from shortly after 6:30 p.m. until midnight, 
when the lounge closed. (R. 23). During this time Mr. Judd had 
consumed so much alcohol that his blood alcohol level was high 
enough to have dropped to .18 by the next morning. (R. 27). 
While socializing with the two women in the motel lobby 
after midnight, the two younger men approached the foursome and 
engaged in conversation. (R. 23). Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle then 
walked the women to their car, and after Mr. Judd spent some time 
kissing the older woman, the women drove away. (R. 23). Soon 
afterwards, Mr. Judd rode the crest of his alcohol-enhanced wave 
of machoism by warning the young men to stay away from all 
vehicles in the parking lot. (R. 24). The young men ran away 
because they had been "scared pretty good." (R. 25, 28). 
Because the young men were no longer near the trucks, any 
supposed goal of protecting the trucks from harm had been 
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achieved at this point. However, Mr. Judd had a loftier purpose 
in mind. Still imbued with the sense of chivalry he had received 
earlier in the evening when he rescued the two maidens at the 
lounge, Mr. Judd had dreams of routing the villains. He pursued 
them into the field until he caught up with them. (R. 25). The 
tide turned when his injuries ensued. 
Viewing the record as a whole, there is paltry evidence that 
might support a finding that the fight arose over Mr. Judd's 
efforts to protect his truck. Since it is unclear whether the 
Board even relied on this paltry evidence in reaching its 
inference, the argument that the inference was not supported by 
substantial evidence becomes stronger. See Burns Bros., Inc. v. 
Employment Div.. 784 P.2d 117, 118 (Or. App. 1989) (when agency 
board fails to explain reason for implicitly disagreeing with 
referee's determination of credibility, impossible to determine 
if board's finding based on substantial evidence); Intern. Bro. 
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs v. N.L.R.B., 587 F.2d 1176, 1180-1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (agency board cannot merely state that it disagrees 
with ALJ but must set forth basis of its disagreement so that 
reviewing court can check for substantial evidence) (Addendum 6). 
By contrast, Judge Allen found that the fight resulted from 
personal antagonism after observing the demeanor and credibility 
of Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle at the hearing. His subsidiary factual 
findings support this inference, for they describe a long evening 
of wooing women, drinking alcohol, and chasing men. Because 
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there is substantial evidence to support Judge Allen's finding, 
Commercial Carriers requests this Court to reinstate it. 
2. CONTRARY TO THE BOARD'S ASSERTION, A FIGHT 
FOR PERSONAL REASONS WOULD NOT ARISE OUT OF 
MR. JUDD'S EMPLOYMENT. 
Perhaps realizing the shakiness of its inference, the Board 
maintained that even if the ALJ's inference were true, "the 
beating was still 'closely entangled' with the work." (R. 54; 
Addendum 5). Nevertheless, the insinuation that an employer can 
somehow be forced to pay for employees' reckless displays of 
machoism contradicts workers' compensation law. 
It has long been the rule in Utah that fights involving 
personal matters do not arise out of one's employment. Wilkerson 
v. Industrial Comm'n.. 71 Utah 355, 266 P. 270 (1928) (injuries 
from fight over cows between employee and neighbor at workplace 
not compensable) (Addendum 7); Garff v. Industrial Comm'n., 247 
P. 495 (1926) (injury inflicted upon sheriff by willful act of 
third person growing out of personal matters did not arise out of 
employment) (Addendum 8). If an assault on an employee is per-
sonally motivated and not exacerbated by employment, the employ-
ment simply does not cause the injuries for purposes of workers' 
compensation law. 
The Board erroneously interpreted the "arising out of" 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 to apply to personal 
altercations. Judge Allen correctly construed the statute and 
concluded that Mr. Judd's injuries from a personal fight were not 
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compensable. This Court can correct the Board's error by rein-
stating Judge Allen's Order. 
B. The Board Erred In Concluding That Mr. Judd's Injuries 
Arose In The Course Of His Employment. 
The Board noted in its decision that for an injury to arise 
in the course of one's employment, it must fall within the time, 
space and work-related boundaries of the employment. (R. 54; 
Addendum 5). Although it properly stated the law, the Board 
incorrectly applied the facts of the case to this law. 
In maintaining that Mr. Judd's injuries fell within the 
time, space and work-related boundaries of his employment, the 
Board noted that Mr. Judd happened to be a truck driver on 
assignment when he got into the fight. The Board also admitted 
that Mr. Judd's socializing earlier in the evening amounted to a 
personal deviation from his work. (R. 54; Addendum 5). The mere 
fact that an employee is injured while on assignment is insuffi-
cient to place the injury within the course of employment when 
the employee takes a personal deviation from work. In Dale v. 
Trade Street, Inc., 854 P.2d 828 (Mont. 1993), a truck driver on 
assignment was injured during a six-hour visit with his brother, 
during which time he consumed alcohol. Observing that travelling 
employees are not covered twenty-four hours a day regardless of 
the conduct in which they engage, the court denied benefits on 
the ground that the truck driver's visit constituted a personal 
deviation from his employment. Id. at 832. 
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The only other factual basis to which the Board refers for 
its conclusion that Mr. Judd's injuries arose in the course of 
his employment is that Mr. Judd checked his truck in the parking 
lot some time before the fight began. (R. 52, 54; Addendum 5). 
As previously pointed out, there is absolutely no evidence in the 
record that Mr. Judd checked his truck before going to the 
convenience store. Since Mr. Judd deviated from his employment 
with his night-long drinking and socializing, his injuries did 
not arise in the course of his employment as a matter of law.5 
The Board's conclusion to the contrary is erroneous. 
By contrast, Judge Allen's assertion that Mr. Judd was not 
in the course of his employment because he was off-duty and not 
responsible for performing work constitutes a correct application 
of worker's compensation law. Walls v. Industrial Comm'n. of 
Utah, 857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993) (injury bartender sustained 
when beer keg fell on foot not in course of employment; shift had 
ended five to six hours prior to injury); Auerbach Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n., 195 P.2d 245 (Utah 1948) (Wolfe, concurring) 
(where employee participated in employer-sponsored sport during 
off-duty hours, injury did not arise in course of employment). 
5In fact, even if the Board's inference that the fight was 
caused by work-related activities were supported by substantial 
evidence, Mr. Judd still deviated from his course of employment 
by violating company regulations instructing employees to call 
the police and not to pursue vandals. M & K Corp. v. Industrial 
comm'n, 189 P.2d 132 (1948) (violations by employee of company 
regulations at the time of accident constitutes departure from 
course of employment). 
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Upon scrutinizing the Board's decision, it is apparent that 
the Board incorrectly applied Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 to the 
supportable facts of this case. Primarily, the Board's con-
clusion that the fight was caused by work-related activities is 
erroneous; its finding that the fight resulted from efforts to 
protect the truck lacks substantial evidence, and its suggestion 
that the fight still would have arisen out of Mr. Judd's 
employment if it resulted from personal antagonism has no basis 
in the law. Because the Board erroneously interpreted the 
"arising out of" requirement, this Court can reinstate Judge 
Allen's Order on this basis alone. The Board also erred in 
interpreting the "arising in the course of" language, providing 
an alternate basis for the Court to reinstate Judge Allen's 
order. Commercial Carriers requests that this Court remedy the 
Board's errors by adopting Judge Allen's decision. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
PERMITTING MR. JUDD TO SUBMIT AN UNTIMELY 
MOTION FOR REVIEW WITHOUT SHOWING CAUSE. 
The day before the deadline established by Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-12(l)(a) to file a Motion for Review, Mr. Judd requested 
an extension of time. His request failed to explain why he 
needed the extension. Over Commercial Carrier's objections, the 
Commission granted Mr. Judd a one-month extension. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(9) 
-18-
require a party requesting an extension of time to file a motion 
to show good cause why the agency should grant the extension. In 
perfunctorily granting Mr. Judd's request without heeding Rule 
6(b) and § 63-46b-l(9), the Board abused its discretion. 
This Court can nullify an agency action if it runs contrary 
to the agency's prior practice. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4) (iii) . In Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Comm'n., 
860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993), this Court presided over a case 
where the Industrial Commission had exercised its practice of 
denying an extension of time to file a motion for review because 
the party failed to show good cause. The petitioner in Maverick 
had only asked for a one-day extension of time in which to file 
the motion, but the Commission stressed that the failure to show 
good cause was fatal. Id. at 950. The Commission's contrary act 
in this area of granting a thirty-day extension in spite of 
failure to show good cause runs counter to prior agency practice 
and constitutes an abuse of discretion. This unwarranted 
extension prejudiced Commercial Carriers because the Board 
ultimately granted Mr. Judd's Motion for Review. Accordingly, 
this Court should nullify Mr. Judd's untimely-filed Motion for 
Review and the Board's ensuing Order Granting the Motion for 
Review. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Board's decision granting Mr. Judd workmen's compen-
sation benefits contains several short comings. The Board 
rejected a key factual finding entered by Judge Allen based upon 
his observation of the witnesses' credibility, then substituted a 
contrary factual finding without explanation or support for the 
finding. It asserted the legally insupportable proposition that 
a personal altercation is caused by one's employment. It main-
tained that Mr. Judd was in the course of his employment when he 
sustained his injuries even though he had logged off work hours 
before. Finally, the Commission arbitrarily permitted Mr. Judd 
an extension to file his Motion for Review without requiring Mr. 
Judd to follow the rules with which all other petitioners must 
comply. 
For the above reasons, Appellant Commercial Carriers 
requests that this Court reverse the Board's Order and deny 
Appellee benefits. 
DATED this o ? ^ day of July, 1994. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
A — P. <*— 
Anne Swensen 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 1: 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92-1401 
RONNY LYN JUDD, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS and/or 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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* 
* 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 29, 
1993, at 8:30 o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law' 
Judge. 
Applicant was present and represented by Bryan 
Davis, Attorney at Law. 
Defendants were represented by Anne Swenson, 
Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Being 
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is 
prepared to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
This case involves the issue of whether or not the applicant 
sustained a compensable industrial accident on or about May 21, 
1992, while employed by Commercial Carriers. The applicant was 
called and testified that he started working for Commercial 
Carriers as a transport truck driver in 1980. Commercial Carriers 
is engaged solely in the business of transporting new and used 
automobiles to various locations across the country. The applicant 
was dispatched out of the Clearfield terminal. 
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In late May of 1992, the applicant and three other drivers 
were flown to Chicago for the purpose of delivering cars in the 
Illinois area. On or about May 20, 1992, the applicant and a co-
worker, Mr. Coyle, were instructed to report to Wentzville, 
Missouri, from whence they were each to drive a load of new 
Pontiacs to Burlingame, California. They arrived in Wentzville on 
May 20, 1992, but by the time they got their cars loaded and ready 
to go, it had already taken nine hours that day. At that time, 
they decided that they would get some rest and start out the next 
morning for the San Francisco area. The applicant and Mr. Coyle 
left Wentzville at 8:30 a.m., and according to both of their 
driver's logs, they arrived there at 6:30 p.m.. However, the 
applicant testified that they actually arrived at 10:30 p.m.. The 
applicant testified that the discrepancy on his driver's log sheet 
was owing to the fact that his father had completed the log for 
him, and he, the applicant, had not caught the mistake according to 
his deposition testimony. At his deposition, the applicant was 
also asked relative to the information on his driver's log for May 
21, 1992, the following: "How did your father get the information 
to fill this out? A: From the other driver, Jim Coyle. Q: And 
was Coyle just mistaken about the hours? A: Yes." The applicant 
went on to explain that he was incapacitated, and had his father 
fill out the log sheet for him. 
The applicant went on to testify that they were allowed to 
drive 540 miles per ten hour period. The applicant indicated that 
based on that rule, they drove until they reached Fort Kearney, 
Nebraska, which was 535 miles from Wentzville, Missouri. The 
applicant testified that they were averaging 52 miles per hour, on 
the trip. The applicant was asked why it would have taken he and 
Mr. Coyle fourteen hours to reach Fort Kearney, and the applicant 
explained that they had stopped for meals and truck checks, and 
because of weather conditions. However, neither the applicant nor 
his witness offered any examples of locations where the weather 
was, in fact, bad. Further, the applicant was unable to explain 
why the meal breaks that he took were not reflected on either his 
driver's log or Mr. Coyle's driver log as required by ICC and 
company regulations. 
The applicant testified that they receive an approved list of 
hotels, and that the Fort Kearney Inn was one of the approved 
hotels. They checked into the motel upon their arrival, and 
thereafter, washed up and went to a motel tavern. The applicant 
testified on. direct examination that he had a drink, however, on 
cross-examination, the applicant allowed that he and Mr. Coyle had 
split a pitcher of beer. The applicant also testified that he had 
a shot of tequila. The applicant's medical records from Good 
Samaritan Hospital, however, indicates that when the applicant was 
seen at that facility later that evening, he had a blood alcohol 
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level of .18. The applicant also testified that Mr. Coyle helped 
him with the pitcher of beer, and also had two Bloody Marys. The 
applicant and Mr. Coyle were seated at a table in the bar, when 
they noticed two women sitting at a table next to them. One of the 
women was in her forties, while the other was in her twenties. The 
younger woman was being hassled or harassed by two younger men. 
The applicant testified that the two men had been walking up and 
asking the women to dance, and that the women did not seem to like 
the idea. Sometime during that process, the applicant and the 
older woman determined that they had previously met in Grand 
Island, Nebraska, approximately five years prior. The applicant 
stated "They decided to come over and sit with us so they could 
avoid the two guys." According to Mr. Judd's further deposition 
testimony, the women were approached twice by the two young men 
before they came over and sat at his and Coyle's table. 
The applicant, as part of his effort to rescue the women from 
the unwanted attentions of the two younger men, invited the women 
over to their table. After they had been invited over, the two men 
went by the table and made some short comments to the younger 
woman. The applicant and his table companions continued with their 
socializing, and at this point, the evidence becomes disputed. The 
applicant and Mr. Coyle testified at the time of the evidentiary 
hearing that the two men came over to the table later and engaged 
them in general chitchat conversation relative to what they were 
doing in town, and whether or not they could take one of the cars 
for a joyride. However, Mr. Judd's deposition testimony of October 
1992, directly contradicts the testimonial evidence of Mr. Judd and 
his witness. In his deposition, on page 29, the following exchange 
took place between the applicant and defense counsel: 
Q: And you say they did not come over to your 
table after the two women came and sat with 
you? 
A: No. 
Q: Did they make any comments to either you or Mr. Coyle? 
A: After we had walked out of the bar, yes, they did. 
Q: So until you had walked out of the bar, you never 
exchanged any words at all with these two men? 
A: Not that I can recall. 
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Having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
applicant and Mr- Coyle, I find that the applicant's deposition 
testimony is more credible, and accordingly, I give it more weight* 
The applicant and his companions stayed at the bar until 
closing, which was apparently at midnight. The applicant and his 
companions left the bar, and were milling around in the lobby of 
the motel. According to the applicant, they then talked for 
approximately five or ten minutes, and while they were talking, 
they were approached by the two younger men. The applicant 
testified that at that time, they asked about what Coyle and Judd 
did for a living, and also inquired as to whether or not they could 
take one of the cars for a drive "Up and down main street. . .". 
The applicant informed the men that was not permissible, and that 
the cars all had alarms on them. The applicant testified that that 
portion of the conversation terminated, and that the younger men 
were also talking with the younger woman. The applicant testified 
that after informing the younger man that they could not have a 
joyride, that the two younger men then walked out into the parking 
lot. The applicant and Mr.Coyle and the women also walked out to 
the parking lot, and the applicant testified that he spent another 
five or ten minutes talking to the older woman, and after giving 
her a big kiss, she and the other woman left on their way back home 
to Grand Island. 
After the women left, the applicant and Mr. Coyle started to 
walk back towards the motel, when the two men from the bar 
approached them and asked if they would like to drink a cold pack 
of beer with them at their room. Mr. Coyle declined, informing 
them that he did not think that was a good idea since they had to 
get up early the next morning and head out. Thereafter, Coyle and 
Judd went over to a Standard station, which had a convenience 
store, to get some pop and cigarettes. Unfortunately, the 
convenience store was closed, and so, Coyle and Judd decided to 
return to the motel lobby, to obtain those items. At this point, 
the versions of the events that transpired next differ. The 
applicant at the hearing, testified that as he was coming back from 
the convenience store, he saw that both of the younger men from the 
bar were on his truck, and it appeared that one of them was trying 
to kick in the window on one of the cars. Since the applicant 
stated that the cars were his responsibility until delivery was 
made, he felt the need to tell these men to get off his truck. The 
applicant then testified that the men got off the truck, and one of 
the men then took a swing at him and hit him in the face, and the 
next thing he remembered was waking up with Coyle and the doctors 
trying to hold him down to take a CT scan. 
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Mr. Coyle in a statement to the police, had a different 
version of the events that transpired after the return from the 
closed Standard station. Quoting from the police report: 
Coyle advised, at this time, he observed the 
male subjects walk along the side of the motel 
on the south side to the west. He said the 
subjects walked about 25 to 3 0 yards into the 
field located just directly west of Fort 
Kerney Inn and then they walked around a 
wooden building out in that field. Coyle 
advised he then had himself and Judd go over 
by their trucks to watch the subjects. He 
advised they stood in the shadow of their 
trucks for approximately 5 - 1 0 minutes, 
waiting to see where the two male subjects 
went to. Coyle advised, a short time later, 
the male subjects came back down in front of 
the motel and started walking in and out of 
the vehicles located inside the parking lot. 
Coyle said the subjects then walked around all 
the trucks that were parked in the parking lot 
and then they walked down through the middle 
of the trucks. Coyle said the subjects then 
walked up between his truck and what he 
thought was a tanker truck setting next to 
his. He said, at this time, he heard one male 
subject tell the other one that this must be 
the vehicles with the alarms. Coyle advised 
this officer earlier when they were talking 
inside the bar, Judd told the subjects to stay 
away from the vehicles because they all have 
alarms on them. Coyle advised he thought one 
of the male subjects then jumped onto the 
truck. Coyle advised, after the subject got 
down off his truck, he came out of the shadow 
of the trucks and confronted the two subjects. 
He advised he told the two subjects he didn't 
want them around their trucks. Coyle advised, 
at this time, they walked approximately 25 to 
3 0 yards into the field just south of their 
trucks, talking to the two subjects. Coyle 
advised that he was telling the subjects that 
they would appreciate it if they would just 
stay away from their trucks and all the other 
trucks that were in the lot. 
On cross-examination, the applicant relented from his prior 
testimony, which seemed to leave the impression that the applicant 
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was struck right near the rear of the truck, and instead, the 
applicant admitted that the two younger men ran to an irrigation 
ditch, that was some 25-30 yards away across the field, and that 
he and Coyle pursued the would be vandals. In his deposition, the 
applicant stated as follows: "Yes. We followed them to make sure 
that they were either going to head away from the trucks or just 
get in the car and get out of there, was what we were hoping." The 
applicant testified further that he and Coyle were not running, but 
that the two younger men were running. He stated: "We had scared 
them, I guess, plenty good enough, because when they got down off 
the truck, they were runnin". The applicant testified that the men 
kept running until they reached the irrigation ditch, at which 
point , they stopped and turned around. The applicant and Mr. 
Coyle then approached the two younger men, and after Mr. Coyle said 
something, one of the younger men took a swing at the applicant and 
struck him in the face, causing the injuries that the applicant now 
complains of. 
Although the applicant testified that one of the men was 
kicking his car, it is interesting to note that at the very time of 
the incident itself, Mr. Coyle made no mention to police that one 
of these men was kicking the windows of one of the cars. It should 
also be noted, that while the applicant testified that it was his 
truck that the young men had climbed onto, Mr. Coyle testified that 
it was his truck. In addition, Mr. Coyle in describing the 
incident stated ". . .He thought one of the male subjects then 
jumped onto the truck." Faced with this variance, I find that the 
version of the incident given by Mr. Coyle to the reporting officer 
would be more reliable than the later version that is now being 
claimed. 
Having set forth the factual variances and findings in this 
matter, those facts must now be applied to the legal requirements 
of the Act. Section 35-1-45, of the Utah Workers Compensation Act 
provides that compensation shall be paid to any employee who is 
injured: ". . .By accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment. . .". As articulated by Professor Larson, in his 
Treatise On Workers Compensation, "The 'arising out of test is 
primarily concerned with causal connection." Larson's Workmens 
Compensation Law, Section 6.00. Larson goes on to indicate in 
Section 14.00 that: 
The course of employment requirement tests 
work-connection, as to time, place and 
activity; that is, it demands that the injury 
be shown to have arisen within the time and 
space boundaries of the employment, and in the 
course of an activity whose purpose is related 
to the employment. 
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Addressing the first statutory requirement of "arising out 
of", requires a discussion of the causation aspect of the 
applicant's injury. The applicant, by and through counsel, 
contends that the beating he suffered at the hands of the younger 
men arose out of his employment as a transport truck driver with 
Commercial Carriers, The applicant's theory being that but for his 
attempts to protect the load and his truck from vandalism, he would 
not have been hurt. However, that theory presupposes that the 
applicant's injury did, in fact, arise out of his desire to prevent 
vandalism from occurring. I do not believe that the assault in 
this matter did, in fact, arise out of the applicant's efforts to 
protect his truck and its cargo from harm. Rather, I find that the 
assault arose out of a dispute between the applicant and his co-
worker and the younger men they encountered in the bar earlier that 
evening. 
The applicant and Mr. Coyle testified that they arrived in 
Fort Kearney at 10:00 - 10:30 p.m., on the evening of May 21, 1992. 
Although their driver's logs clearly indicate they arrived four 
hours earlier at 6:30 p.m.. Initially, the Administrative Law 
Judge believed the applicant's testimony that because of the 
confusion surrounding his injury and the seriousness of his 
injuries, that he had, through an oversight, failed to catch the 
error which had been made on his driver's log by his father. The 
reader may recall that the applicant also testified at his 
deposition that the information for his driver's log entry of May 
21, 1992, was taken by his father from information furnished to him 
by the applicant's co-worker, Mr. Coyle. At first blush, the 
Administrative Law Judge was not overly concerned with that 
discrepancy, and was prepared to let it pass unnoticed. However, 
after further reflection and review of all of the records contained 
on this file, I now find that driver's log discrepancy is of major 
importance. While it was understandable that the applicant's 
driver's log would contain an error, since his father, a nondriver 
had filled it out, it cannot be said that Mr. Judd's father also 
filled out Mr. Coyle's driver's log for May 21, 1992. Mr. Coyle, 
when asked directly why his log contained that discrepancy, gave a 
truly incredible answer. He indicated that he had mistakenly 
filled out his log because he feared for his personal safety. That 
explanation, just does not ring true, and can only be the product 
of a fraudulent attempt to hide the true facts of this matter. 
In this regard, the applicant testified that he had only 
consumed half of a pitcher of beer and one shot of tequila, and 
yet, based on that consumption, the applicant would have us believe 
that as a result of those drinks, his blood alcohol content ended 
up at .18, more than twice the legal limit in Utah. That the 
applicant's blood alcohol content was as high as it was, over two 
hours after he had last consumed his last drink, can only mean that 
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at the time the applicant left the Fort Kearney Inn, in fact, his 
blood alcohol level was even higher than the .18, he tested at the 
Good Samaritan Hospital in Fort Kerney, Nebraska. That leads the 
Administrative Law Judge to conclude that the applicant had 
consumed far more alcohol than he testified to at the evidentiary 
hearing. If that discrepancy in the amount of alcohol is coupled 
with the time discrepancy with respect to when the applicant 
arrived in Fort Kearney, it can only lead to one conclusion in my 
opinion, and that is that the applicant and Mr. Coyle did, in fact, 
arrive in Fort Kearney much earlier than the 10:30 p.m. time frame 
they would have us believe. Thus, it would appear to the 
Administrative Law Judge that rather than merely having a few 
drinks at the bar, in fact, Mr. Coyle and Mr. Judd had numerous 
drinks, and, in fact, had spent quite a significantly longer period 
of time there drinking. Unfortunately, as the result of their 
intoxication, which they both were, their judgment in this 
situation was severely impaired. 
It will also be recalled by the reader, that the applicant had 
testified that after the bar had closed, he spent no more than 
approximately 25 or 3 0 minutes with the women in the lobby and 
parking lot, and thereafter, the altercation ensued and he was 
injured. However, a close review of the police incident report 
belies that assertion. The police report indicates that incident 
occurred and the police were called at approximately 1:57 a.m. on 
the morning of May 22, 1992. When asked on cross-examination, how 
he could explain his activities for the approximate one and one-
half hours that elapsed between when the women left and when he was 
assaulted, the applicant had no credible or viable explanation. 
Thus, I can only conclude that more transpired than
 teither Mr. 
Coyle or Mr. Judd is willing to testify to. 
A further difficulty with the applicant's claim, is his 
contention that the would be vandal was kicking the windows out of 
his vehicle. If, in fact, the applicant did observe that activity 
occurring, he should have gone into the lobby of the motel and 
called the police. The applicant was not required, by any stretch 
of the imagination, to personally take care of police matters 
himself. The Driver's Handbook, which was admitted into evidence, 
specifically indicates: "Off duty: When the driver is not on 
duty, he is not required to be ready for duty or is not under any 
responsibility for performing work." As indicated previously, the 
applicant's driver's log and Mr. Coyles driver's log for May 21, 
1992, clearly indicate that both of those gentlemen were off duty 
as of 6:30 p.m.. Therefore, from that point on, the applicant and 
Mr. Coyle. were on their own time, and could do whatever activities 
they wanted. The file indicates that they did engage in social 
activities that evening, and they also engaged in some serious 
consumption of alcoholic beverages. 
RONNY LYN JUDD 
ORDER 
PAGE NINE 
The report that Mr, Coyle made to the police officer is very 
enlightening. As may be recalled, Mr. Coyle thought he saw one of 
the men on his truck, and that after they got off, and he yelled at 
them, they ran into a field toget away from the applicant and Mr. 
Coyle, having been "scared pretty good" by them. At that point, 
Mr. Coyle and the applicant should have gone to the lobby of the 
motel and called the police, if they felt that there was any 
further danger to their vehicle or to their cargo. However, that 
is not what transpired. Rather, based on the remarks made by Mr. 
Coyle as reflected in the police report, it would appear that Mr. 
Coyle and the applicant basically engaged in "tough talk" to the 
two younger men. Specifically, Mr. Coyle not only told the younger 
men that they should stay away from he and Mr. Judd's truck, but 
also told them to stay away from all the trucks in the parking lot. 
There being no evidence that Mr. Coyle had been deputized by the 
Fort Kearney Police Department, it is unclear where he derived such 
authority under these circumstances. 
It can only be concluded that Mr. Coyle and Mr. Judd had for 
all intents and purposes appointed themselves a parking lot police 
department. When the tenor of Mr. Coyle's comments to the men are 
considered, in light of their prior dealings earlier that evening 
in the bar, it would appear reasonable to the Administrative Law 
Judge to conclude that there was some antagonism between the 
applicant and Mr. Coyle and those two younger men. Although Mr. 
Coyle and Mr. Judd tried to downplay any friction, it would appear 
that Mr. Coyle and Mr. Judd served as "knights in shining armor" 
and rescued the two women from the unwanted attentions of those two 
younger men. To say that the relations between Coyle and Judd and 
those two younger men from that point on were somehow on a friendly 
basis, is to deny human nature. In addition, sight should not be 
lost of the fact that both Mr. Coyle and the applicant were very 
intoxicated on the evening of May 21, 1992, and it would be assumed 
that they and the two younger men were competing for the attention 
of the two women. As indicated previously, this intoxication 
ultimately led to the injuries sustained by the applicant in this 
case. In other words, had the applicant not been very intoxicated, 
he and Coyle both, would not have had their judgment impaired, such 
that they would have felt the need to take the law into their own 
hands. As indicated previously, they had no duty to do so. 
Further, once the would be vandals were off the truck, if, in fact, 
they were on the truck at all, which seems in doubt considering the 
level of intoxication present in this case; regardless, once those 
would be vandals left the truck and were running away from the 
scene of the "crime", any further activity on the part of Coyle and 
Judd was beyond the scope of reasonable conduct. Coyle and Judd 
had no duty to pursue those would be vandals, and in so doing so, 
they deviated completely from any possible course and scope that 
they might have had with respect to their employment. 
•n x\n 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The injury sustained by Ronny Lyn Judd on May 21, 1992, did 
not arise out of and in the course of his employment with 
Commercial Carriers. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the workers compensation claim of 
Ronny Lyn Judd, alleging a compensable industrial accident on May 
21, 1992, should be, and the same is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Certified this day of 
May, 1993. 
ATTEST: 
ADDENDUM 2: 
CITED PAGES FROM HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
1 minutes later closed down, you went out to say your good 
2 nights to this gal you previously knew? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. How long were you in the parking lot? 
5 A. Ten minutes, 15 minutes. 
6 Q. And then she left? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Do you know where she went? 
9 A. They told us that both of them lived in 
10 Grand Island, Nebraska. 
11 Q. Then what happened? 
12 A. They left, and then we walked back into the 
13 lobby for a minute and then decided, well, let's go get 
14 a soda pop over at the convenience store. Along the way 
15 over there — 
16 Q. How far was the convenience store? 
17 A. — it was on the way over there or on the 
18 way back, we saw these same guys that we had met in the 
19 bar trying to climb on one of the trucks. And it looked 
20 to me like they were trying to kick one of the windows 
21 out of one of the cars. 
22 Q. So what did you do? 
23 A. We tried to chase them off. And when they 
24 got onto the ground about the only thing I really 
25 remember after that is I got hit real hard. The next 
24 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And there was a streetlight in close 
3 proximity to your trucks; is that correct? 
4 A. There was a streetlight on the other side of 
5 the two trucks, closer to the motel. 
6 Q. And you drew that streetlight on a diagram 
7 at the time of your deposition and it's attached to your 
8 deposition; is that correct? 
9 A. Yes, as far as I could recall that is. 
10 Q. What instructions have you been given by 
11 Commercial Carriers in the event that your cargo or your 
12 truck is vandalized? What are you supposed to do? 
13 A. Report it to the sheriffs. 
14 Q. That's the first thing? 
15 A. Sheriff or city police, wherever we happen 
16 to be. 
17 Q. That is the first thing you do. Then what 
18 do you do after that? 
19 A. I contact the company. 
20 Q. What does the company do? 
21 A. The company follows up apparently on the 
22 police reports. 
23 Q. Do they ever send out an investigator? 
24 A. Not to my knowledge. 
25 Q. Have you ever been in a situation where your 
46 
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for the company. 
Q. What does Commercial Carriers require of a 
driver when he is off duty in terms of protecting his 
cargo? 
A. When he's off duty, when he goes off duty, 
are you referring to at night or during the day? 
Q. Well, I'm referring to at night or if he 
takes an hour lunch break or — 
A. After he has done his tour of duty that day 
he secures his truck, checks his truck, he's off duty, 
he can pursue his own activities. 
Q. Do you require him to park the truck in a 
safe place? 
A. The safest place possible, yes. 
Q. Do you require your drivers to sleep with 
the truck? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you require the drivers to keep the truck 
within their view when they're off duty? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you hold drivers responsible for 
vandalism to the trucks or the cargo when they're off 
duty? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever or has Commercial Carriers 
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ever trained or instructed drivers to pursue vandals? 
A. No, we have not. 
Q. What do you instruct drivers to do if 
there's vandalism to their trucks or cargo? 
A. They are instructed to call the police, get 
ahold of the company and they will take it from there. 
Q. Are drivers disciplined or reprimanded if 
there is damage to their cargo, say, as a result of 
their negligent driving like driving into an overpass or 
backing into another vehicle? 
A. Yes,, they are. 
Q. In a circumstance such as this if — had 
this incident been investigated, and I assume it was, 
and the vehicles were parked at an approved motel in the 
safest place possible and either the trucks or the cargo 
on the trucks had been vandalized, would either driver 
have been reprimanded or disciplined in any way? 
A. No. 
Q. What are the drivers instructed to do if 
they find someone messing with their trucks or their 
cargo? 
A. I don't believe that we have ever instructed 
them of what to do. 
MS. SWENSEN: I don't have anything further. 
THE COURT: Cross? 
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ADDENDUM 3: 
MOTION FOR CONTINENCE FOR RESPONSE TO APPEAL 
Bryan B. Davis 5600 
Attorney for Applicant Judd 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone 969-8811 
Fax 965-6400 
COPY 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
RONNY L. JUDD, 
Applicant, 
vs 
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS INC. 
and OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO., 
DEFENDANTS. 
MOTION FOR CONTINENCE 
FOR RESPONSE TO APPEAL 
ALJ :ALLEN 
Case No. 92-1401 
Comes now the Applicant, Ronny L. Judd by and through counsel 
of record Bryan B. Davis, and hereby moves for a thirty (3 0) day 
extension to file a response for reconsideration and supporting 
memorandum in the ruling by judge Allen in the above entitled case. 
Respectfully submitted this the day June of 1993. 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I caused to be faxed and mailed postage 
prepaid to the Indus-trial Commission State of Utah at (801) 530-
6804 and maiAe'd to the\ Industrial Commission located at 160 East 
300 Soutpij f.O. Box 510250 Salt lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
ADDENDUM 4: 
OBJECTION TO APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINENCE 
[SIC] FOR RESPONSE TO APPEAL 
ANNE SWENSEN [A4252] 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONNY JUDD, 
Applicant, DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR 
VS. CONTINENCE [SIC] FOR RESPONSE 
TO APPEAL 
COMMERCIAL CARRIER, 
Case No. 92-1401 
Defendant, 
The defendants, Commercial Carriers, Inc. and Ryder 
Services, by and through their counsel of record, object to the 
applicant's Motion for a thirty-day extension to request 
reconsideration of Judge Allen's ruling in this matter. 
Judge Allen's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
are dated May 5, 1993. The Order includes a provision that any 
Motion for Review shall be filed within thirty days of May 5th. 
Rule 568-1-5 "Allowance for Mailing" of the Workers Compensation 
Rules—Procedures, Utah Administrative Code, provides that 
whenever a notice or other paper requiring or permitting some 
action on behalf of a party is served on a party by mail, three 
days shall be added to the prescribed period as allowed under 
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
the Court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . 
order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the 
expiration of the period originally prescribed . . . or upon 
motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit 
the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of 
excusable neglgect . . . . 
Applicant has stated no just cause for an extension of time, 
nor has he specified excusable neglgect. While the Motion which 
apparently seeks enlargement of time to file a motion for 
reconsideration was filed on the last day of the specified time 
period, the Rules require that cause must be shown. 
Defendants respectfully request that applicant's Motion be 
denied and that Judge Allen's Order of May 5, 1993 be held final 
and not subject to review or appeal* 
DATED this y day of June, 1993. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ANNE SWENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Lynette Farmer, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for defendants herein; that she served the attached DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION TO APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINENCE [SIC] FOR RESPONSE 
TO APPEAL (Case Number 92-1401, Utah State Industrial Commission) 
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Bryan B. Davis, Esq. 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the %Jt<^ day of June, 1993. 
.ynetre Farmer Lyne  
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f?44 day of June, 
1993. 
State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
.^STS!^ NOTARY PUBLIC 
/^:5S£>^\ MARILYN L. JONES 
/ r / V-=iS-> y \ PC Box45000. lOExcnangePl 
ts! fifjiiijfi i f ) Salt Lake City. Utah 84U5 
\V\ v ^ * * f $ / / / MV Commission Expires 
\ j \ . ^ J ^ A y * September 25. 1994 
x
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ADDENDUM 5: 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE NO. 92-1401 
RONNIE LYN JUDD, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER GRANTING 
vs. * 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS AND OLD * 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE, * 
Defendants. * 
Ronny Lyn Judd seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's 
Order denying him compensation under Utah's Workers Compensation 
Act.1 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW 
The issue before the Commission is whether Mr. Judd's injuries 
arose out of and in the course of his employment, as required by 
§35-1-45 of the Act. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission makes the following findings of fact: 
1. .-Mr. Judd has been " employed as a truck "driver by 
Commercial Carriers since 1980, working out of the company's 
Clearfield, Utah terminal. 
2. During mid-May, 1992, Mr. Judd and another driver, Mr. 
Coyle, were assigned to drive two trucks loaded with new 
automobiles from Missouri to California. 
3. Judd and Coyle left Missouri the morning of May 21. 
Because they were limited by company policy and/or government 
regulation to driving no more than 10 hours or 540 miles at a 
stretch, they stopped at Ft. Kearney, Nebraska for the night. 
4. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Judd and Coyle located an 
appropriate motel in Ft. Kearney, parked their trucks adjacent to 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 et seq. 
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each other in the parking lot, checked into their respective rooms, 
then went to the motel's lounge. 
5. In the lounge, Judd and Coyle consumed alcoholic 
beverages. Two women already in the bar, one of whom was a slight-
acquaintance of Judd, joined them at their table. To some degree, 
the women joined Judd and Coyle to avoid the attentions of two 
other younger men, who had been asking the women to dance. 
6. When the lounge closed, Judd and Coyle walked the two 
women to their car and said goodby. The women then drove away. 
7. At approximately the same time, the two young men who had 
also been in the lounge struck up a conversation with Judd and 
Coyle. The young men suggested they buy more beer and drink it in 
their motel room. Judd and Coyle declined the offer, stating it 
was too late and that they had to leave early the next morning. 
8. During the course of this conversation, the young men 
expressed interest in the new cars Coyle and Judd were 
transporting. The young men suggested they would like to take one 
of the cars for a drive. Judd told the young men that such use of 
the cars was not permitted and that the cars all had alarms in 
them. 
9. At this point, Judd and Coyle left the young men and 
walked into the parking lot to check their trucks. They then 
walked across the parking lot to a convenience store to buy some 
personal items, but the store was closed. 
10. As they walked back to the motel, Judd and Coyle observed 
the two young men walk into a field adjacent to the parking lot, 
then return to the-parking lot and walk around the cars and trucks 
that were parked there. Judd and Coyle went to their trucks and 
observed the young men from the shadows. 
11. The young men approached Judd and Coyle's trucks and were 
heard to say "these must abe the vehicles with the alarms". Judd 
and Coyle then stepped out from the shadows and told them to stay 
away from their trucks and all the other trucks in the parking lot. 
12. The two young men ran away into the field. Judd and 
Coyle walked into the field after them. Approximately 3 0 yards 
into the field, the young men stopped. One of them began beating 
Judd, resulting in very serious injuries that give rise to Judd/s 
claim for compensation. 
13. Hospital blood tests establish that Judd had a blood 
alcohol level of .18% at the time the test was taken, after the 
beating. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISCUSSION 
As a preliminary note, the Commission has essentially accepted 
the ALJ's determination of every point of disputed fact. Thus, as 
far as the objective facts are concerned, there is no variance 
between the Commission and the ALJ's findings. However, the 
Commission does not accept the inferences the ALJ has drawn from 
those objective facts. In particular, the Commission finds no 
basis to conclude that Judd's beating was the outgrowth of a 
dispute over the women at the bar. 
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides 
compensation to each employees "who is injured . . . by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment.11 In the case 
of Mr. Judd, it is conceded that he was injured and that the injury 
was by accident, as that term is used in the workers' compensation 
law. The only issues that are disputed are whether his injury: 1) 
arose out of his employment; and 2) arose in the course of his 
employment. Those two issues are discussed in that order below. 
I. ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT 
As noted by the ALJ's decision, in workers' compensation law 
the term "arising out of employment11 requires a causal connection 
between the injury and the employment. Neither the parties nor the 
ALJ have cited any Utah appellate decisions which specifically 
apply the foregoing requirement to facts similar to this case. 
However, Professor Larson discusses the subject: 
The controlling test should be 'if the circumstances of 
the employment can be fairly said to have elicited 
conduct by the employee which results in his injury.' 
(Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, §11.11(c), 
p. 3-205.) 
More specifically with respect to fights involving employees, 
Professor Larson states: 
If the fight is spontaneous and closely entangled with 
the work itself, as most are, the assertion that the 
claimant left his employment is an outright fiction, and 
fictions should not be invented to block benefits 
conferred by remedial statutes. (Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Vol. 1, supra, §11.15(a), p. 243.) 
It is difficult to imagine a situation where an employee's 
work could be more entangled with an ensuing fight. Judd presence 
in Kearney and at the very motel where the injury occurred was 
just one stop on a continuing work assignment. The very nature of 
his employment involved the transport and concomitant safe 
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keeping of his truck and its cargo. The fight resulted from Judd 
and Coyle's efforts to keep the other men away from the trucks. 
The Commission notes the hypothesis that Judd's beating 
resulted from a fight over women rather than a fight over the truck 
and cars. There is no objective evidence to support that 
hypothesis and the Commission does not accept it. However, even if 
the hypothesis were true, the beating was still "closely entangled 
with the work itself". The Commission therefore finds that Judd's 
injuries arose out of his employment. 
II• IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
As noted above, not only must an employee's injury "arise out" 
of the employment to be compensable: it must also be "in the 
course of" the employment. 
The term "in the course of employment" requires both that the 
injury arise within the time and space boundaries of the employment 
and in the course of an activity related to the employment. 
(Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, supra, §14.00, page 
4-10 
As a truck driver on assignment, Judd's injuries clearly arose 
within the time and space boundaries of his employment. Even 
though Judd had parked his truck some hours earlier and had spent 
time in the motel lounge, any such personal deviation from his work 
duties ended when Judd and Coyle checked their trucks after 
leaving the lounge, then returned to the trucks out of a suspicion 
that the two younger men might have theft or vandalism in mind. 
For the same reasons, the Commission finds that Judd's 
injuries arose in the course of an activity related to his 
employment. 
The question of whether Judd and Coyle exercised good judgment 
is not relevant to this discussion, as the negligence of an 
employee is not a bar to workers' compensation benefits. As to 
Judd's intoxication, the Commission recognizes that both Judd and 
Coyle had been drinking on the night in question and that Judd had 
a blood alcohol level high enough to render him unfit to operate a 
motor vehicle. While §35-1-14 of the Act requires a 15% reduction 
in compensation when injury is caused from the intoxication of the 
employee, the facts before it do not allow the Commission to 
conclude that Judd's intoxication caused his injuries. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Mr. 
Judd's injury suffered during the early morning hours of May 22, 
1992, in Kearney Nebraska, arose out of and in the course of his 
employment by Commercial Carriers. 
DECISION 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge in this matter is 
reversed and the workers'' compensation claim of Ronny Lyn Judd is 
hereby reinstated. This matter is remanded to the Adjudication 
Division of the Industrial Commission of Utah for such further 
action as is required on Mr. Judd's claim, consistent with this 
decision. It is so ordered. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid 
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVJEW in the case of RONNY LYN JUDD, Case 
Number 92-1401, on / / ^ d a v of -y^g,*—^O< , 19^ V to the 
following: 
RONNY LYN JUDD 
4729 SOUTH 4140 WEST 
KEARNS, UTAH 84118 
BRYAN B. DAVIS 
3587 WEST 4700 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84119 
ANNE SWENSEN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PALACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
P O BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY 
770 REAR EAST PITTSBURG STREET 
GREENSBURG, PA 15601 
TIMOTHY C. ALLEN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Paralegal 
General Counsels Office 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
ADDENDUM 6: 
INTL. BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFERURS WAREHOUSMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 310 v. NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD, 587 F.2D 
to produce the necessary adequate and well-
controlled studies. It would constitute the 
most arid formalism for this court to re-
mand this case to FDA to require it to state 
what has since become obvious; namely, its 
reasons for concluding that, contrary to the 
recommendation of the NAS-NRC panel, 
petitioner had not yet demonstrated the 
effectiveness of Nylmerate under statutory 
standards. 
The order of the Commissioner is there-
fore 
Affirmed. 
O | KEY NUMBER S Y S T E M ^ 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WARE-
HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF 
AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 310, Petitioner, 
v. 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, Respondent, 
United Steelworkers of America, 
Intervenor. 
No. 76-2065. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit. 
Argued 19 Jan. 1978. 
Decided 1 Aug. 1978. 
A labor union sought review of an or-
der of the National Labor Relations Board 
dismissing an unfair labor practice com-
plaint against other unions as members of a 
joint representative. The Court of Appeals, 
Wilkey, Circuit Judge, held that* (1) unions 
which are constituents of a joint represent-
ative breach their duty of fair representa-
tion to another contituent union by accept-
ing a collective-bargaining contract on 
which their own members voted, without 
affording that other union a prior opportu-
nity to ratify the contract, and (2) where 
strike settlement agreement, entered into 
by all but the one union, made employees of 
such one union liable to discharge at mo-
ment of acceptance of the contract, when 
being on picket lines, they could not possi-
bly have known that a contract existed, or 
even subjected such members to retroactive 
liability for picketing before the contract 
came into being, and where a member of 
one of the other unions had not only accept-
ed but actually had proposed language de-
trimental to such members of the one un-
ion, negotiation of the strike settlement 
agreement constituted breach of duty of 
fair representation to the one union. 
Remanded for proceedings consistent 
with opinion. 
Robb, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion 
dissenting in part. 
1. Labor Relations <3=>598, 599, 680 
Under National Labor Relations Act, 
ultimate fact finder is National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and courts appropriately defer 
to presumptively broader gauge and experi-
ence of its members, as between Board and 
administrative law judge, but while Board 
is free to draw different inferences from 
facts found by ALJ, its inferences should 
also rest upon some findings, and Board 
must not merely state that it disagrees but 
must set forth basis of its disagreement 
with ALJ so that court may determine 
whether Board's finding is supported by 
substantial evidence in record as a whole. 
National Labor Relations Act, § 10(f) as 
amended 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(f). 
2. Labor Relations <s=>759 
Union's breach of its duty of fair repre-
sentation gives aggrieved employee right of 
action in state court, or in federal court 
under statute giving to district courts origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action or pro-
ceeding arising under any act of Congress 
regulating commerce or protecting trade 
and commerce against restraints and mo-
nopolies, or under Labor Management Rela-
tions Act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337; Labor Man-
INTERN. BRO. OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS v. N. L. R. B. ] 
Cite as 587 F.2d 1176 (1978) 
agement Relations Act, 1947, §§ 1 et seq., 
301, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141 et seq., 185; Nation-
al Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(b)(1)(A), 9(a) 
as amended 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 
159(a). 
3. Labor Relations <s=»219 
Exclusive representative owes duty of 
fair representation to all workers in unit, 
not merely to its own union members. Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(b)(1)(A), 
9(a) as amended 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a). 
4. Labor Relations <s=>222 
Labor Act does not require union to 
accord its rank-and-file members right to 
ratify collective bargaining contract which 
it has negotiated, but once certified repre-
sentative has determined to gain member-
ship approval before it accepts contract, it 
must accord opportunity to vote equally to 
all unit members. National Labor Rela-
tions Act, §§ 8(b)(1)(A), 9(a) as amended 29 
U.S.C.A. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a). 
5. Labor Relations <s=»222 
Vote of members of one union, which 
was member of joint representation group, 
to reject further extensions of old contract 
and vote of other unions to accept final 
offer that became the contract, could not be 
combined by administrative law judge or 
National Labor Relations Board so as to 
rule that such other unions allowed mem-
bers of first-mentioned union equal oppor-
tunity to exercise their vote, thus satisfying 
obligation, of such other unions to first-
mentioned union, of fair representation. 
National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8 
(b)(1)(A), 9(a) as amended 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a). 
6. Labor Relations «©=222 
Under evidence, right of members of 
one union, which was member of joint rep-
resentation group, to vote on contract offer 
by employer was denied by other members 
of such joint group, in violation of duty of 
fair representation, whether or not such 
vote was necessary to determination of out-
come on contract offer, and despite conten-
tion, rejected by the court, that members of 
the one union, by exercising lawful right to 
strike on expiration of old contract an» 
such reason being dispersed, forfeited 
right to vote. National Labor Rela 
Act, §§ 8(b)(1)(A), 9(a) as amended 29 
C.A. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a). 
7. Labor Relations <a=>219 
Where strike settlement agreerr 
entered into by all but one union of j 
representation group, made employee! 
such one union liable to discharge at 
ment of acceptance of the contract, w 
being on picket lines, they could not p< 
bly have known that contract existed 
even subjected such members to retroac 
liability for picketing before contract a 
into being, and where member of one of 
other unions had not only accepted but 
tually had proposed language detrimei 
to such members of the one union, s 
other unions entertaining animus tow 
such one union, negotiation of the str 
settlement agreement constituted breach 
duty of fair representation to the one uni 
National Labor Relations Act, §§ 
8(b)(1)(A), 9(a) as amended 29 U.S.C 
§§ 157, 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a). 
8. Labor Relations <&=» 395.2 
A union commits unfair labor practi 
of causing or attempting to cause employ 
to discriminate against employee in viol 
tion of National Labor Relations Act wh 
such union causes or attempts to cause ei 
ployer to discriminate against an employ 
in regard to hire, tenure or condition 
employment. National Labor Relatio 
Act, § 8(b)(2), as amended 29 U.S.C, 
§ 158(b)(2). 
Petition for Review of an Order of tr 
National Labor Relations Board. 
Benjamin W. Hilley, Great Falls, Mont 
with whom Emilie Loring, Great Fall, 
Mont., was on the brief, for petitionei 
Charles P. Donnelly, Atty., N. L. R. B., o 
the bar of the Supreme Court of Texas, pr 
hac vice, by special leave of the Court wit! 
whom Leon S. Gottlieb, Beverly Hills, Cal. 
and Allen J. Kwawer, Encino, Cal., John S 
Irving, Gen. Counsel, Carl L. Taylor, Associ-
ate Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Deputy As-
sociate Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., Wash-
ington, D. C , were on the brief, for respon-
dent. 
Before ROBINSON, ROBB and WIL-
KEY, Circuit Judges. 
Opinion for the Court filed by WILKEY, 
Circuit Judge. 
Opinion filed by ROBB, Circuit Judge, 
dissenting in part. 
WILKEY, Circuit Judge: 
Teamsters Local 310 petitions for review 
of an order of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) dismissing an unfair labor 
practice complaint. The complaint charged 
that three AFL-CIO unions, as members of 
a joint representative, breached their duty 
of fair representation to members of the 
Teamsters, in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of 
the Labor Ac t ; ! and that those unions at-
tempted to cause the employer to discipline 
or discharge members of the Teamsters, in 
violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the 
Act.2 The Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) upheld these charges, but was re-
versed by the Board.3 We believe that the 
Board's order is not supported by substan-
tial evidence, and we accordingly remand 
for findings of fact and conclusions of law 
consistent with the evidence in the record 
as a whole. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTS 
The facts, essentially undisputed, are 
elaborated in the decisions below and can be 
1. NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) 
(1970): 
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a 
labor organization or its agents— 
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in 
the exercise of the rights [to organize and 
bargain collectively] guaranteed in section 
157 of this title: Provided, That this para-
graph shall not impair the right of a labor 
organization to prescribe its own rules with 
respect to the acquisition or retention of 
membership therein 
2. NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970): 
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a 
labor organization or its agents— 
recapitulated briefly here. Since 1968 un-
ions representing employees in the nonfer-
rous mining industry have engaged in na-
tionwide coordinated bargaining. This co-
ordination is effected through a National 
Conference, a coalition of 26 unions which 
delegates to a Steering Committee the re-
sponsibility for setting minimum bargaining 
goals as guidelines for negotiations with 
industry employers. Before concluding a 
collective bargaining agreement, local nego-
tiating committees must submit contract 
proposals to the Steering Committee for 
approval. 
The employer in this case is Duval Corp., 
a copper company, which engages in collec-
tive bargaining on a single-employer basis. 
Negotiations on behalf of Duval's workers 
are conducted by a negotiating committee 
comprised of representatives from four un-
ions: the Steelworkers, Laborers, Operating 
Engineers (collectively, the AFL-CIO un-
ions), and the Teamsters. As is the pattern 
in the nonferrous mining industry, these 
four unions have been jointly certified as 
the exclusive bargaining agent at Duval's 
properties; the joint representatives thus 
function as "the union" in negotiating and 
signing collective-bargaining contracts. 
Dissension between the AFL-CIO unions 
and the Teamsters has existed for years and 
forms the backdrop of the negotiations at 
issue here. This dissension manifested it-
self in discourtesies at the bargaining table 
and violence in the field, in "raids" by one 
union on the membership lists of others, 
and in the filing of representation petitions 
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an em-
ployer to discriminate against an employee in 
violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section 
NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), 
prohibits an employer from encouraging or dis-
couraging membership in any labor organiza-
tion "by discrimination in regard to hire or 
tenure of employment or any term or condition 
of employment. 
3. The AU ' s decision is printed at 226 N.L.R B. 
775 (1976). The Board's decision and order is 
printed in id. at 772, 94 L.R.R.M. 1239 (1976). 
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designed to secure replacement of a given 
union by its rival. 
In August 1974 Duval and the joint rep-
resentatives commenced bargaining to re-
place the contract that was to expire 30 
September 1974. In an apparent effort to 
insulate itself from the uncertainty attend-
ing the interunion rivalry, Duval at the 
outset informed all four unions of the com-
pany's understanding that negotiations 
would continue on a joint basis, and that 
"once the Spokesman for the Unionfs] in-
forms the Company that a new Collective 
Bargaining Agreement has been accepted 
. a new agreement exists."4 The 
ALJ found on undisputed testimony that 
Duval reiterated this position during the 
course of negotiations and that the unions 
agreed.5 The spokesman for the union ne-
gotiating committee was a member of the 
Steelworkers. 
Joint negotiations continued amid in-
creasing acrimony through 1 October; sev-
eral issues were resolved, but Duval's wage 
offer still fell short of the Steering Commit-
tee's guideline. The negotiations recessed 
that evening so that the Teamsters' mem-
bership could vote on extending the old 
contract further; the Teamsters met sepa-
rately, as they had done on previous occa-
sions, in order to avoid a hostile confronta-
tion and possible violence. At this meeting, 
the Teamsters voted 213-42 to reject addi-
tional contract extensions and to strike; 
they apprised the AFL-CIO unions of their 
vote and set up picket lines. 
Later that evening negotiations resumed 
between Duval and representatives of the 
AFL-CIO unions, at which time the compa-
ny raised its wage offer to meet the Steer-
ing Committee's guideline. The Teamsters' 
representatives did not attend this session; 
4. 226 N.L.R.B. at 779. 
5. Id. The Board made the same finding, id. at 
77 , 94 L.R.R M. at 1240: 
Duval's attorney sent a letter to 
the various members of the joint representa-
tives stating, in part, that, once the spokes-
man for the unions had informed the Compa-
ny that a collective-bargaining agreement 
there was a dispute, unresolved by t 
as to whether they were informs 
On the morning and evening of 2 
the AFL-CIO unions held membersl 
fication meetings to consider Duva 
tract proposals. Members of the Te. 
and their representatives were refu 
mission to these meetings. DuvaPi 
concessions were conveyed to the AE 
employees at the evening session, ai 
voted 474-110 to accept the contrac 
spokesman for the negotiating con 
called the Teamsters' representati 
forming him that there was a contn 
that the Teamsters' pickets were "il 
called the Steering Committee and n 
authorization to accept the contrac 
notified the company that "they had 
lective-bargaining agreement."6 Th 
and the Board both found that, und 
terms of the union-company understa 
a contract thereupon came into beinf 
On 3 October the Teamsters' repre 
tives and picket captains were to 
peatedly by AFL-CIO and company 
cials that a contract was in effect an 
the pickets were illegal. The Teai 
replied that they had not yet ratific 
contract, that their ratification m< 
could not be scheduled until that e\ 
owing to the difficulty of reassen 
workers dispersed by the strike, and 
the pickets would not be removed unti 
fication had occurred. The Teamsters 
fied the contract that evening and 
down the picket lines. 
On the afternoon of 3 October repn 
atives of the company met with repres 
tives of the AFL-CIO unions to negoti 
strike-settlement ("back-to-work") a 
ment. The Teamsters were not notifi 
had been accepted, a new agreement e> 
Although the unions did not reply to 
letter, [the Duval Representative's] unc< 
verted testimony was that this positioi 
restated during the course of the negoti* 
and agreed to by the unions. 
6. 226 N.L.R.B. at 781. 
7. Id. at 786; id. at 775, 94 L.R.R.M. at 
this meeting,8 and no Teamsters attended 
it. The spokesman for the negotiating com-
mittee (who, as noted above, was a member 
of the Steelworkers) proposed,9 and the 
company accepted, a provision under which 
Duval agreed not to commence any legal 
action against the AFL-CIO unions, but 
reserved the right "to seek redress against 
any individual union" and "to discharge or 
discipline any employee" who continued to 
picket or to sanction a strike or picket 
against the company "after 9:30 p. m. on 
October 2, 1974," in violation of the new 
contract's no-strike clause.10 
On 4 October 1974 Duval discharged two 
Teamsters employees and disciplined a third 
for picketing on 2 and 3 October in violation 
of the no-strike clause. These workers had 
been warned, directly or indirectly, that 
their picketing was illegal because the new 
contract was in effect. The ALJ found 
that the discharged employees had been 
aggressive in processing grievances, active 
in implementing the Teamsters' program of 
soliciting members from the ranks of the 
AFL-CIO unions, and vocal exponents of 
the Teamsters' demands in collective-bar-
gaining negotiations.11 The ALJ also found 
considerable evidence of employer hostility 
to these workers.12 Efforts to reinstate the 
workers failed, and the Teamsters filed 
charges with the Board. 
B. Course of the Litigation 
The ALJ found that the AFL-CIO unions 
had breached their duty of fair representa-
tion to the Teamsters, in violation of 
8. 226 N.L.R.B. at 786 & n. 29. See id. at 772 n. 
1. 
9. Id. at 781. 
10. Id. The contract agreed to on the evening of 
2 October contained the following provision, id. 
at 782: 
Section 2. No strike. 
(1) The Union agrees that during the life of 
this Agreement there shall be no strike, work 
stoppage, or slowdown called, authorized, 
approved, or sanctioned by the Union. 
(2) Any employee who actively partici-
pates in, supports, or encourages any such 
strike, work stoppage, or slowdown shall be 
subject to discipline or discharge by the 
Company with right of appeal to the Griev-
§ 8(b)(1)(A), by accepting the collective-bar-
gaining contract before the Teamsters had 
had an opportunity to ratify it. The ALJ 
found that these unions had likewise 
breached their duty of fair representation 
to the Teamsters, in violation of 
§ 8(b)(1)(A), and had attempted to cause the 
employer to discharge or discipline Team-
sters employees, in violation of § 8(b)(2), by 
negotiating a strike-settlement agreement 
which made Teamsters liable to discharge 
for picketing at a time when they could not 
be expected to know that a contract con-
taining a no-strike clause had been conclud-
ed. The ALJ recommended that the AFL-
CIO unions be ordered to cease and desist 
from unfair labor practices, and, finding 
that their breach of duty had directly con-
tributed to the disciplined workers' loss of 
employment, recommended that they be or-
dered to make those workers whole for any 
loss of pay they had suffered. The Board, 
reversing the ALJ, drew different inferenc-
es from the facts, found no violations of the 
Act, and dismissed the complaint. 
II. ANALYSIS 
[1] We review the Board's order to de-
termine whether its findings are "supported 
by substantial evidence on the record con-
sidered as a whole." I3 The findings and 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
form an important part of the "record" on 
which this judgment of substantiality is to 
be based.14 Under the statute, of course, 
the ultimate factfinder is the Board, and 
courts appropriately defer to "the presump-
ance Procedure only as to the determination 
of the question of whether the employee so 
disciplined or discharged did actively partici-
pate in, support, or encourage such strike, 
work stoppage, or slowdown. 
11. Id. at 782. 
12. Id. at 782, 783. 
13. NLRA § 10(0, 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1970). 
14. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 
474, 492 97, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); 
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 143 
U.S.App.D.C. 383, 395, 444 F.2d 841, 853 (1970) 
(Leventhal, J.). 
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tively broader gauge and experience of [its] 
members." 15 But while the Board is free 
to draw different inferences from the facts 
found by the ALJ, its inferences "should 
also rest upon some findings;" the Board 
must not "merely [state] that it disa-
grees," l(J but must "set forth the basis of 
[its] disagreement with the ALJ so that we 
may determine whether the Board's finding 
is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record as a whole." 17 
A. Duty of Fair Representation 
[2] The principles of labor law that 
frame our decision are well established, and 
the parties do not disagree as to them. A 
union has the duty, derived from its status 
as certified exclusive bargaining agent un-
der § 9(a),18 to represent all employees in 
the unit fairly.19 This duty governs the 
union's behavior in all phases of the collec-
tive-bargaining process, from the negotia-
tion and acceptance of collective agree-
ments to their enforcement through the 
processing of grievances.20 Breach of the 
duty of fair representation violates 
§ 8(b)(1)(A), for it tends to encourage work-
15. Oil Workers Local 4-243 v. NLRB, 124 U.S. 
App.D.C. 113, 116, 362 F.2d 943, 946 (1966) 
(Leventhal, J.). 
16. Retail Store Employees Local 400 v. NLRB, 
123 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 362, 360 F.2d 494, 496 
(1965) (Fahy, J.). 
17. Local 441, IBEW v. NLRB, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 
53, 55, 510 F.2d 1274, 1276 (1975) (Leventhal, 
J.). 
18. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970): 
Representatives designated or selected for 
the purposes of collective bargaining by the 
majority of the employees in a unit appropri-
ate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such 
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining 
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment . . . . 
19. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 
903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Humphrey v. 
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 
L.Ed.2d 370(1964). 
20. See C. J. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 
743 AA (1971) (citing authorities). 
21. See, e. g., Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169, 
1174 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 983 & 
ers to join, or discourage them from joinin 
certain unions, thus restraining them in tl 
free exercise of their § 7 rights.21 In ord< 
to constitute an unfair labor practice, 
union's conduct must be more than mere 
negligent; it must be "arbitrary, discrim 
natory, or in bad faith,"22 or be based c 
considerations that are "irrelevant, invirj 
ous, or unfair."23 
[3] The AFL-CIO unions in this cai 
were jointly certified with the Teamsters i 
the exclusive bargaining agent for Duval 
employees. Since an exclusive represent; 
tive owes a duty of fair representation 1 
all workers in the unit, not merely to i 
own union members,24 there can be r 
doubt, and the Board does not deny, ths 
the AFL-CIO unions owed a general dut 
of fair representation to the Teamsters en 
ployees here. The Board, however, do< 
deny that these unions breached their dut 
in either of the respects found by the AL. 
the ratification of the contract and the n< 
gotiation of the strike-settlement agre< 
ment.25 We discuss these issues in tun 
1022, 97 S.Ct. 499 (1976); Truck Drivers Loc 
568 v. NLRB, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 367-36 
379 F.2d 137, 144-45 (1967); Local 12, Unitt 
Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (51 
Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 837, 88 S.C 
53, 19 L.Ed.2d 99 (1967); Miranda Fuel Cc 
Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962 
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d CI 
1963). A union's breach of its duty of fa 
representation also gives the aggrieved emplo; 
ee a right of action in state court, or in feder 
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) or LMR 
§ 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See Vaca 
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-80, 87 S.Ct. 903, 1 
L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); T. Kheel, 6 Labor La 
§ 28.03[2a] (1974); C. J., Morris, supra note 2 
at 739. 
22. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 190, 87 S.Ct. i 
916. 
23. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. at 181 
51 L.R.R.M. at 1586. 
24. E. g., Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 24! 
255, 65 S.Ct. 238, 89 L.Ed. 216 (1944). 
25. The Board also rejected the ALJ's conch 
sion that the AFL-CIO unions breached the 
duty of fair representation by denying th 
Teamsters' business representatives access t 
[4]
 m 1. The Ratification Procedures. 
The Labor Act does not require a union to 
accord its rank-and-file members the right 
to ratify a collective-bargaining contract 
which it has negotiated. The ALJ rea-
soned, however, that once a certified repre-
sentative has determined to gain member-
ship approval before it accepts a contract, it 
must accord the opportunity to vote equally 
to all unit members. This reasoning, we 
think, is sound. By denying a group of 
workers the chance to ratify, the union 
risks subjecting them to the disadvantages 
of a contract whose acceptance they could 
have prevented, and risks depriving them of 
the benefits of a contract whose acceptance 
they could have ensured. By discriminating 
against a group of workers in this way, a 
union plainly fails to represent them fairly 
"in respect to [their] rates of pay, wages, 
hours . , or other conditions of em-
ployment" 26 over the coming contract term. 
In this case the ALJ found that the AFL-
CIO unions accepted the new contract on 
the basis of the ratification vote of their 
own members, at a time when the Team-
sters had not ratified and under circum-
stances in which they could not ratify until 
the next day. Finding the action of these 
unions arbitrary and evidencing hostile dis-
crimination, the ALJ concluded that a viola-
tion of the duty of fair representation had 
been established. 
The Board, while nowhere denying that 
the AFL-CIO unions' conduct was arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, seeks 
to rationalize its rejection of the ALJ's con-
clusion on two grounds. It argues, first, 
that the Teamsters in effect were given an 
opportunity to ratify the contract when 
the 2 October membership ratification meet-
ings. See p - of 190 U S App DC . p 1179 
of 587 F.2d supra. We see no reason to disturb 
the Board's order in this respect. 
26. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 
27. Brief of NLRB at 17, 18. 
28. The Board states in its decision that the 
spokesman for the AFL CIO unions actually 
made this calculation, out of deference to the 
Teamsters, before communicating acceptance 
of the contract to Duval. See 226 N.L.R.B. at 
773, 94 L.R.R M at 1241. The ALJ, however, 
they voted on 1 October; and second, that 
the AFL-CIO unions owed the Teamsters 
no duty of fair representation with respect 
to contract ratification, since ratification 
was "entirely an internal union affair," a 
mere "advisory" vote with "no effect on the 
terms and conditions of Teamster employ-
ment."27 These arguments rest on ques-
tionable logic, derive no evidentiary support 
from the record, and must be rejected. 
[5] First, the Board reasons that the 
Teamsters 1 October ballot, in which they 
voted 213^2 to reject Duval's then-current 
proposals and to strike, can be added to the 
AFL-CIO unions' 2 October ballot, in which 
they voted 474 110 to accept Duval's final 
offer, thus producing an overall vote of 
51r>-323 to accept the contract.28 This ar-
gument is illogical, both in qualitative and 
in quantitative terms. The Teamsters on 1 
October did not vote on the final offer that 
became the contract; they voted to reject 
further extensions of the old contract and 
to strike, at a time when Duval had not 
made its final offer and when its wage 
proposal was not even up to the Steering 
Committee's guideline. The two votes, in 
short, were on different things, and to add 
them together, as the ALJ said, is to "add 
apples and oranges." 29 Quantitatively, the 
Board's argument fares no better. There is 
no reason to believe that the same number 
of Teamsters would have voted on 2 Octo-
ber as voted on 1 October, or that the 
outcome of their vote would have been the 
same. There were 425 Teamsters in the 
bargaining unit, more than enough to have 
defeated the contract's ratification, and the 
Board's speculations as to what the Team-
sters' vote might have been 30 are without 
made no such finding, and the testimony on 
this subject was ambiguous. See J.A 254-55. 
29. 226 N.L.R.B. at 785. 
30. Speculation about the possible results of a 
new vote by the Teamsters simply cannot, in 
any event, operate to neutralize the AFL-CIO 
unions' omission in the circumstances of this 
case. Though the final contract offer was more 
favorable to the Teamsters than the proposal of 
1 October, the Teamsters who voted to accept 
the initial offer might well have been encour-
aged by Duval's concessions to press for fur-
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evidentiary support. The AFL-CIO unions' 
refusal to let the Teamsters vote on the 
contract cannot be justified by speculating 
that their vote would not have mattered. 
[6] The Board's second argument, that 
the AFL-CIO unions owed the Teamsters 
no duty of fair representation with respect 
to contract ratification because ratification 
was "entirely an internal union affair," is 
no more convincing than the first. As a 
general proposition, it is true that a union 
only breaches its duty of fair representation 
when it discriminates against employees "in 
matters affecting their employment."31 
This is because a union's duty of fair repre-
sentation derives from its status as exclu-
sive bargaining representative under § 9(a); 
a union, therefore, can be held to represent 
employees unfairly only in regard to those 
matters as to which it represents them at 
all—namely, "rates of pay, wages, hours 
., or other conditions of employ-
ment."32 Notwithstanding the correctness 
of its premise, however, the Board's argu-
ment that depriving the Teamsters of the 
opportunity to vote on a contract that 
would govern them for the next three years 
had "no effect on the terms and conditions 
of [their] employment" is preposterous. 
The Board starts with the proposition 
that, under the terms of the union-company 
understanding, a collective-bargaining con-
tract would be held to come into being 
when the spokesman for the negotiating 
committee communicated its acceptance to 
ther gains instead of ratifying the new proposal 
as it was. That being so, it was incumbent on 
the AFL-CIO unions to afford the Teamsters an 
opportunity to cast their ballots on the offer of 
2 October. Thus, even were it reasonable to 
conclude that the Teamsters favoring the first 
offer would have voted similarly with respect 
to the second—a prophecy we decline to en-
dorse—the substantial risk of the contrary re-
sult made necessary a second vote by the 
Teamsters. And it was untoward for the AFL-
CIO unions to deny them that privilege while 
extending it to the AFL-CIO membership. The 
dissent misses this fundamental point in urging 
that the Board's prediction of a particular out-
come had some support in the evidence. See 
diss. op. at of 190 U.S.App.D.C, at 
1186 1187 of 587 F 2d. 
Duval. From this, the Board concludes U 
membership ratification was merely "ad\ 
ory" and thus was not "necessary" to c< 
tract acceptance. This may be correct as 
the Duval-union relationship, but not as 
the inter-union arrangement. For to s 
that, as between Duval and the unions, 
contract came into being on 2 October (a 
we accept the findings of the ALJ and t 
Board that it did) is not to say that, 
between the AFL-CIO unions and tl 
Teamsters, the spokesman acted properly 
communicating acceptance before tl 
Teamsters had ratified. 
The Teamsters' ratification may not ha> 
been "necessary" in the sense that its al 
sence rendered the contractual acceptanc 
void; but this does not mean that the 
ratification was not "necessary" in th 
sense that the AFL-CIO unions proper! 
had to get it first. All the evidence in th 
record indicates that membership ratifies 
tion was necessary in the latter sense. Th 
undisputed evidence revealed that all previ 
ous contracts at Duval had been submitter 
for membership ratification prior to accept 
ance.33 The constitutions of three of th< 
constituent unions (Laborers, Operating En 
gineers, and Teamsters) required member 
ship ratification prior to acceptance.34 Mosl 
importantly, the AFL-CIO unions them 
selves acted in accordance with the belie! 
that ratification was required prior to ac-
ceptance, since the spokesman did not com-
municate acceptance of the contract to Du-
31. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 
51 L.R.R.M. at 1586. See Retana v. Apartment 
Operators Union Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1024 
(9th Cir. 1972). ("It is no answer to say that 
the complaint relates to appellee union's 'inter-
nal* policies and practices. . . As a prac-
tical matter, intra-union conduct could not be 
wholly excluded from the duty of fair represen-
tation, for . internal union policies and 
practices may have a substantial impact upon 
the external relationships of members of the 
unit to their employer.") 
32. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 
33. See 226 N.L.R.B. at 785; J.A. at 476. 
34. See J.A. at 473. 
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val until immediately after the AFL-CIO 
members' votes had been counted.35 
For these reasons, we conclude that the 
AFL-CIO unions did in fact deny the 
Teamsters the opportunity to ratify the col-
lective-bargaining contract,38 and that in so 
doing those unions discriminated against 
the Teamsters "in matters affecting their 
employment." We accordingly hold that 
the Board's order dismissing this aspect of 
the complaint is unsupported by substantial 
evidence. 
[7] 2. The Strike-Settlement Agree-
ment The ALJ found that the AFL-CIO 
unions breached their duty of fair represen-
tation to the Teamsters by negotiating a 
strike-settlement agreement that subjected 
Teamsters employees to discharge for pick-
eting at a time when they could not be 
expected to know that a new contract con-
taining a no-strike clause had been conclud-
ed. As noted above, the strike-settlement 
agreement made Duval employees liable to 
discharge for picketing after 9:30 p. m. on 2 
October. The evidence is in dispute as to 
when the new contract came into being. 
35. The only evidence the Board cites for the 
proposition that membership ratification was 
"irrelevant" to contract acceptance is "the fact 
that earlier in 1974, the Steering Committee 
compelled negotiators to reject a contract at 
Anamax (an industry employer) despite mem-
bership ratification." Brief of NLRB at 20 n. 7. 
In the Anamax situation, the Steering Commit-
tee refused to approve a proposed contract 
because it provided for a wage increase below 
the Steering Committee's guideline. See pp. 
of 190 U.S.App.D.C, pp. 1178 1179 
of 587 F.2d supra Yet the fact that the Com-
mittee could compel rejection of a contract that 
the membership had accepted does not demon-
strate that it could compel acceptance of a 
contract that the membership had rejected. As 
noted in the text, the practice at Duval was 
precisely the contrary. 
36. The dissent argues that "the Teamsters were 
accorded the same opportunity as the other 
employees to vote on October 2 on the final 
offer;" it was only because the Teamsters 
"were out on strike [that they] did not vote that 
day." Diss. op. at of - — U.S.App.D.C, at 
1186 of 587 F.2d (emphasis added). This argu-
ment, we think, is somewhat formalistic. The 
AFL-CIO unions knew full well that the Team-
sters employees had been dispersed by the 
strike and could not be assembled for a vote 
until 3 October. Any "opportunity" the Team-
The company representative testified that 
the spokesman called him to accept the 
contract at 9:30 p. m. on 2 October; the 
spokesman himself placed the time of noti-
fication at 11:00 p. m.37 At best, then, the 
strike settlement agreement made employ-
ees liable to discharge at the moment of the 
contract's acceptance, when Teamsters on 
the picket lines could not possibly have 
known that a contract existed; at worst, 
the strike settlement agreement subjected 
the Teamsters to retroactive liability for 
picketing IV2 hours before the contract 
came into being. The ALJ, resolving credi-
bility questions, found that the AFL-CIO 
unions had not even notified the Teamsters 
of the strike-settlement meeting.38 Again 
making credibility resolutions, the ALJ 
found that the spokesman (a member of the 
Steelworkers) not only had accepted, but 
actually had proposed, the language detri-
mental to the Teamsters.39 Finding ample 
evidence of AFL-CIO animus towarJ the 
Teamsters, the ALJ concluded that negotia-
tion of the strike-settlement agreement 
constituted a breach of their duty of fair 
representation. 
sters were given to vote on 2 October, there-
fore, was utterly meaningless. If the AFL-CIO 
unions really were representing the Teamsters 
fairly, they would not have accorded them such 
a spectral opportunity to exercise their rights. 
Nor do we think that the AFL-CIO unions' 
conduct can be rationalized on the theory that 
the Teamsters "forfeited" their right to vote by 
going on strike. See diss. op. at of 190 
U.S.App.D.C, at 1186 of 587 F.2d Judge Robb 
does not deny that the Teamsters had the right 
under § 7 to strike after their contract had 
expired. Judge Robb seems to agree that the 
Teamsters, on the facts of this case, also had 
the right to an equal vote on the collective-bar-
gaining contract. To suggest that the Team-
sters, by exercising their first right, should be 
held to have forfeited the second, is to pose a 
dilemma quite foreign to the spirit of our labor 
law. The dilemma, in any event, is particularly 
obnoxious here because it was created by the 
AFL-CIO unions. If they had simply waited 
until after the Teamsters had voted no one 
would have had to "forfeit" any rights at all. 
37. 226 N.L R.B. at 780. 
38. Id. at 786 & n. 29. 
39. Id. at 786 & n. 28. 
INTERN. BRO. OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS v. N. 
Che as 387 F.2d 1176 (1978) 
L. R. B. 
The Board, while explicitly accepting all 
of the ALJ's credibility findings,40 rejected 
this conclusion. In its decision, the Board 
made no findings and gave no reason for 
doing so. In its brief, the Board argues 
that the Teamsters employees were not dis-
ciplined because of the strike settlement 
agreement, but for picketing in violation of 
a no-strike clause in a valid contract; and 
that they were not disciplined unknowingly, 
but after repeated warnings that a contract 
existed and that their picketing was in con-
sequence illegal.41 Whatever the merit of 
these arguments, they are irrelevant to the 
issue here. The causes and the rightfulness 
of the actual discharges on 4 October have 
nothing to do with the propriety of the 
AFL-CIO unions' action the day before. 
The ALJ found that those unions deliber-
ately and unfairly subjected Teamsters em-
ployees to an unreasonable risk of discharge 
for unknowing conduct. Whether this risk 
was realized in precisely the way the A F L -
CIO unions envisioned is immaterial in de-
ciding whether they breached their duty of 
fair representation in creating it. We ac-
cordingly hold that the Board's order dis-
missing this aspect of the complaint was 
unsupported by substantial evidence. 
[8] B. Attempt to Cause Discharge of 
Employees. A union violates § 8(b)(2) 
when, for arbitrary, irrelevant, or invidious 
reasons it causes or attempts to cause the 
employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in regard to hire, tenure, or condition 
of employment. The ALJ found that the 
AFL-CIO unions, by negotiating the strike-
settlement agreement as described above, 
attempted to cause Duval to discharge pick-
eting Teamsters employees because they 
were part of a dissident group.42 The ALJ 
further found that the AFL-CIO unions' 
conduct directly contributed to the disci-
plined employees' loss of employment, and 
recommended that they be made whole. 
The Board, having found no breach of the 
duty of fair representation in violation of 
§ 8(b)(1)(A), likewise found no attempt to 
cause discharge in violation of § 8(b 
and concluded that the discharges owe< 
to the unions' conduct, but to the en 
er's independent decision to discharge i 
ers who were violating a no-strike clat 
a valid contract. 
In view of the sparseness of the reco 
this issue, we express no view on the n 
of the (b)(2) claim or on the appropriat 
of the ALJ's proposed remedy. On reri 
the Board will have to reconsider its co 
sion that the AFL-CIO unions did 
breach their duty of fair representati< 
negotiating the strike-settlement a] 
ment. If it concludes that the duty 
breached, the Board should consider wl 
er that breach per se constitutes a viols 
of § 8(b)(2) or whether more evidence c 
attempt to cause discharge is necessary 
the Board finds a violation of § 8(bXS 
should consider whether that violation 
causally related to the disciplining of 
three Teamsters employees, giving ar, 
priate weight to the ALJ's findings of 
ion and employer hostility towards tl 
In this connection the Board should 
consider the relevance of the General G 
sel's determination that Duval, in firing 
workers, did not discriminate against tl 
in regard to tenure of employment in vi 
tion of § 8(a)(3). 
Remanded for proceedings consist 
with this opinion. 
ROBB, Circuit Judge, dissenting in p 
I think the Board's conclusions regard 
the ratification procedure were consist 
with the Administrative Law Judge's fi 
ings and supported by substantial evidei 
Therefore those conclusions cannot be < 
turbed on the basis of the contentions urj 
by petitioner Teamsters. Accordingly 
dissent from that part of the majoril 
opinion reversing the Board's holding t 
the AFL-CIO unions did not breach Ui 
duty of fair representation in the cond 
of the contract ratification. 
40. Id. at 772 n. 1. 42. 226 N.L.R.B. at 786-87. 
41. Brief for NLRB at 23-25. 43. Id. at 775, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1243. 
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The ALJ ruled that the AFL-CIO unions 
breached their duty by denying the Team-
sters the same opportunity to vote on con-
tract ratification as was accorded to the 
other employees. 226 N.L.R.B. 785. The 
ALJ said that a union was not required to 
permit employees to vote on a proposed 
contract, but that once the right to vote 
was granted it must be extended to all 
evenly. The Teamsters' opportunity to vote 
on the offer outstanding on October 1 was 
not, according to the ALJ, an adequate 
substitute for the opportunity to vote on 
the final offer because the later offer con-
tained additional employer concessions. Id. 
As a corollary to this ruling, the ALJ found 
that the AFL-CIO unions further breached 
their duty by accepting the contract before 
the Teamsters had voted on the final order. 
226 N.L.R.B. 786. 
The Board disagreed. I t concluded that 
if the Teamsters had no opportunity to vote 
on the final offer, it was due to the union's 
"gofing] its own way" and calling a strike. 
226 N.L.R.B. 774. The Board also noted 
that the AFL-CIO unions had considered 
the ratification vote by the Teamsters on 
October 1 in determining that a majority of 
employees favored the final offer. Id. The 
Teamsters had voted 213 to 42 to reject the 
proposal before them on October 1. Id. 
The Board found that when added to the 
AFL-CIO votes cast on October 2, the 
Teamsters vote showed that 516 employees 
favored accepting the contract while 323 
would reject it. Id. The Board therefore 
believed that a second Teamsters vote 
would not have changed the outcome Id. 
The Board's principal ground for its re-
versal of the ALJ—that any lack of an 
opportunity by the Teamsters to vote on the 
final offer was due to the union's decision 
to strike—is contrary to neither the ALJ's 
findings nor the evidence. The Board 
merely concluded as a matter of law that 
the Teamsters must be held accountable for 
their unilateral action of withdrawing and 
striking. This conclusion is supported by 
the evidence and by the ALJ's findings, and 
justifies affirmance of the Board's holding. 
The ALJ found that the Teamsters' busi-
ness representative received a copy of the 
final offer on the afternoon of October 2 
when it was delivered to the other unions, 
and that the business representative noti-
fied Duval that the Teamsters would be 
unable to vote on the offer that day be-
cause they were not working. 226 N.L.R.B. 
780. Thus, the Teamsters were accorded 
the same opportunity as the other employ-
ees to vote on October 2 on the final offer; 
because they were out on strike, however, 
the Teamsters did not vote that day. 
Nor was the alternate ground for the 
Board's conclusion contrary to the evidence. 
The Board concluded that in light of the 
results from the AFL-CIO union's vote on 
October 2 and the Teamsters' vote on Octo-
ber 1, a second Teamsters vote would not 
have affected the outcome. This conclusion 
is not contrary to any factual finding by the 
ALJ. Moreover contrary to the majority's 
assertion, I think the Board could rely on 
the Teamsters vote on October 1 as at least 
indicative of how the Teamsters would have 
voted on the offer, which proposed greater 
union benefits than the earlier offer. The 
company had added to its final offer a wage 
increase plus several concessions for which 
the union negotiators had fought hard. 
Further, the final offer included a union 
demand apparently benefiting only the 
Teamsters: installation of air conditioning 
on haulage trucks. 226 N.L.R.B. 780. In-
stallation of the air conditioning was a 
Teamsters' demand that had been with-
drawn from bargaining by a majority vote 
of the union negotiating committee. 226 
N.L.R B. 779. However, because of the 
Teamsters' direct appeal to Duval, coupled 
with the union's threat to thwart conclusion 
of an agreement, Duval agreed to install air 
conditioning in the trucks. 226 N.L.R.B. 
779. Accordingly, the Board's conclusion 
that at least an equal number of Teamsters 
would have voted to accept the more attrac-
tive final offer was reasonably derived 
from the evidence. 
The Board's reversal thus was not predi-
cated on any finding contrary to those of 
the ALJ and it was fully supported by the 
record. Moreover, the Board's conclusion 
that the AFL-CIO unions had not discrimi-
nated against members of the Teamsters on 
the basis of any unfair, arbitrary, irrele-
vant, or invidious distinctions was reasona-
ble. Like the members of the other unions, 
the Teamsters had the opportunity on Octo-
ber 2 to vote on the final offer. The 
Board's conclusion that they forsook it by 
going on strike was reasonable. Further, 
the Board acted reasonably in taking into 
account the earlier vote by the Teamsters. 
The majority has substituted its conclusion 
from the evidence for the expert judgments 
of the Board. This a court cannot do. 
NLRB v. Bridge Workers Local 103, 434 
U.S. 335, 98 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed.2d 586 
(1978); see 29 U.S.C. § 160. 
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Two individuals brought suit under the 
Freedom of Information Act against the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
seeking disclosure of documents concerning 
plaintiffs in CIA files. The United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, 
dismissed the suit upon the basis of affida-
vits supplied by an official of the CIA, and 
plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals 
held, inter alia, that: (1) as regards a claim 
of exemption under the FOIA, Congress has 
left the matter of in camera inspection 
the discretion of the district court, with 
any indication of the extent of its pro 
use; the ultimate criterion is simply t 
whether the district judge believes that 
camera inspection is needed in order 
make a responsible de novo determinat 
on the claims of exemption; (2) in resr 
to the CIA's invocation of exemptions 1 
and 6 to disclosure of certain docume 
under the FOIA, a critical problem of s 
regability was shown on the record prese 
ed—some portion of the documents mij 
be exempt, but the FOIA might contc 
plate disclosure in part; the difficulty ar« 
from the CIA's proffer of multiple exen 
tions for each withheld document, and v 
maintained by the district court's conclu 
ry rulings, and (3) as regards the FOIA, 
agency may not rely on the "exemption 
document" approach even in a national J 
curity context; the agency must provide 
reasonable segregation as to the portions 
the document that are involved in each 
its claims for exemption. 
Error; remanded. 
J. Skelly Wright, Chief Judge, co 
curred in the remand and filed an opinio 
1. Records <s=»14 
As regards de novo review of Freedo 
of Information Act exemptions claimed 1 
the government, the salient characteristi 
of de novo review in the national securi 
context can be summarized as follows: ( 
government has the burden of establishh 
an exemption; (2) court must make a < 
novo determination; (3) in doing this, 
must first accord substantial weight to i 
agency's affidavit concerning the details < 
the classified status of the disputed recor 
and (4) whether and how to conduct an i 
camera examination of the documents res 
in the sound discretion of the court. 
U.S.C.A. § 552. 
2. Records <s=»14 
If exemption from the Freedom of Ii 
formation Act is claimed by the goven 
ment on the basis of national security, tli 
court must be satisfied that proper proc< 
ADDENDUM 7: 
WILKERSON v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, ET AL. 
ITO MM PACIFIC RXPOBTBB (Utah 
present % court and stipulated that the of-
lor should bo made. There la nothing in 
Mir statute requiring the service of a notico 
rf th* entry of an ordor retaxtng costs. • 
This court baa bold that a part? who pre-
pares tbo findings of fact, conclusion* of 
aw, and doeroo moat of necessity bo deemed" 
bo have notice of tbo decision. Jensen v. 
Lfefatensteln* 45 Utah, 320,145 P. 1086; Cody 
r. Cody, 47 Utah, 4M» 154 P. 962. So, bare, 
J*e attorneys tor defeudsnta who filed a peti-
tion to retax coata and upon tbo hearing ot\ 
hair petition atipulatod that tbo amount of 
?oats bo fixed at 198 moat of necessity bo 
loomed to baro notice of what waa dona up* 
m their request and in their praaenco. Wo 
MO no oocapo from tho eoncluaion that tho 
notion to atrika tho bill of exception* ahonld 
» granted. Such ia tho order. All of appal* 
tots' assignments of error are baaed upon 
tho bill of exceptions. 
It therefore follows that the Judgment ran* 
lared in this eanae ahonld be and the same is 
ifltaned. Respondent ia awarded coata. 
THUBMAN, a J^ and CH1CBBY, STHAUP, 
ind GIDEON, JJn concur. 
WILKERSON V. INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH et at (No. 4607.) 
Court of Utah* Hsrch 26, 1928. 
1. Master and servant *»4O0(4)-Evldeeee la 
ssapmatlu precooslaoa sestaleed ftsolsf 
that wesnd reserved by etalamat wes laileted 
la coarse of private quarrel wttfe third party 
(Corns. Laws l«U 7, | SI 12). 
gfldonco In compensation proceadinia for 
Injury to read employee operatinf grader aeid 
to sustain finding that gunshot wound was re* 
carved hi course of scufle with a traveler on the 
highway, rotating to a nutter not connected 
with dshnantfs employmentt under Comp. Laws 
1917,1*112. 
2. Masto sad servant e>*37S<l)-£»sleyee 
gradieg read who eeeaaed fa altareatlea with 
third peraes oaeeoraiof aerseeaf oriovaaco 
held aet entitled ta cewpsaaatlea for weaad 
from ethers gas (Coma, Laws iai791 SI 12). 
Kssployee engaged fat grading road* who 
temporarily left his employment to engage in an 
sltereatien with a traveler en the highway eon* 
earning a persons! grievance unrelated to mat-
ters connected with his employment, and who 
fas the course of scuffle received a fcuashot wound 
from the ether's gun, Asa* not entitled to com-
pensation, sines injury was not indicted because 
of the employment as required by Gonsp. Lsws 
lM7, |3ra» 
tho Workmen's 
poneaHosi Act by J. U WBkereon, opposed by 
the Indnstrlal Cofitmission of Utah and oth-
ana, Froaa an award -denying plaintiff's sp» 
lysmmstssetaadgi? 
plication for compensation* plaintiff brings 
certiorari. Affirmed* 
L. A. McGee, of Orlce, for plaintiff. 
Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Genu, and J. Robert 
Bobinson, Aaat AUy. Gen* for defendants. 
- ^ • • * • 
THUBMAN, C. J. Certiorari to review an 
award of the Utah Industrial Commission 
denying plaintiff's application for compensa-
tion. 
Xt ia admitted that on July 20, 1927, the 
plaintiff, Wilkerson, was in the employ of the 
Utah state road commission, engaged in driv-
ing a road grader toward the east on what 
ia known as the Oolton-Duchesne highway. 
The grader was being drawn by a four-horse 
team driven by Wilkerson on the left side of 
the road throwing a swath of gravel to the 
left or lower side. While Wilkerson waa 
thus engaged a car driven by Mary Lowland, 
accompanied by Frank Both sitting on her 
right on the front sent, approached from the 
east on the same aide of the road upon which 
Wilkerson was operating the grader. When 
the car and grader met both stopped. Wil-
kerson dropped the reins of his horses and 
descended from the grader. He went to the 
right side of the car, where Both sat, and an 
altercation occurred between him and Both, 
in which Wilkerson received n gunshot 
wound which resulted in a serious injury. 
Wilkerson applied to the commission for com-
pensation under the Indnstrlal Act. 8everal 
hearings were had upon the application and 
compensation denied. Behearing was also 
denied, and the case ia before this court for 
review. 
The state insurance fund carries the ineur> 
ancev and the Jurisdictional facts are admit* 
ted, except that it is contended by the de-
fendants that tho injury received by Wilker-
son for which be claims compensation was 
not the result of an accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment On the oth-
er hand, it la oontendad by the applicant that 
the injury did occur BM the result of an and* 
dent arising in the course of his employment; 
This is the only question to he determined. 
The following findings of fact and conclu-
sion found by the commission reflects the 
commission's view of the evidence and are of 
sufficient importance to Justify quoting them 
at length: 
['That on July 2fc 1927, at about 10*0 a. nu 
anpBcant was driving a grader east on the Ool-
tott-Ducheane highway, and WflMam Allen, an-
other employee of the road coatinieelon, waa op-
erating the grader; that as they were ap-
proaching along the left aide of the road throw* 
ing a swath of gravel to the lower aide at a poms 
about two aftee west of the Bamberger monu-
ml«nt, Mary Leveland and Frank Both ap-
proached from the east; traveling west; that 
afftteant had made a tarn at a curve about 
150 feet back of where the car waa met; thai 
-.Hi waatposeffale fee the applicant end Wiffiani 
Ota* WILRRSOH T. 
M3km2 who vert oe the trader, to tee the ep-
meedMac car far a distance of approximately 
R00 feet; that aa the car approached the grad-
er, ajfolleaat i m m hie horeea to the right 
scrota the toad aad stopped them, thue torn-
atoteU btocklag the car from paeaiag to the 
right jwhtle the grader hlochtd paeeage to the 
left: 1 that applicant threw the Hnee down, 
walked arooad the team* went up to the car and 
started te heat Roth, who wae sitting hi the 
ear; that la defending bimeelf Roth reached on* 
der the eeat and got hold of a gun* and daring 
the taisulag struggle shot applicant in the right 
thigh*] the bullet ranging downward and free-
torted the lower third of the right femur; that 
applicant fell on the running hoard and rolled off 
late the road at the same time calling to Roth 
not~t4 ehoot him again; that Mar/ foreland* 
who wae driving the car* got oat and went to 
Wlftereoa to help him; that William Allen, who 
wo* at the grader wheel,«had got down from the 
graded aad started arooad to the car when the 
ahot waa ired; that he did not hear any con-
rareatioa or see what transpired at the car, his 
vision] beiag obscured by the team; that when 
AQaWmt arooad in front of the team where 
he could see what had happened, he waa instruct* 
ad by] applicant to straighten up the teim and 
i pass; that he did so and Roth drore by, 
the car, picked op Mary Lords nd, and 
ded toward Oelton; that Wllkeraoa waa 
into a stage coach which had driven 
ap **$ taken to his home near the Bamberger 
artaumeet; that Dr. Melrose, of Price, was 
called land gart treatment; that Wnkeraon waa 
heapltjrfsed la the Price City Hospital and waa 
ceafiaed there op to and including the date on 
which the hearing in thia case was held; that 
Pranh Roth had lived ia the same vicinity in 
Carbon county aa applicant for something over 
a yeei and at times had worked for applicant, 
| which time he fired at applicant's home; 
: other times he visited applicant and his 
aad stayed with them aa a guest for a 
i at a time; that preceding the incident 
Coltoit-Dueheene road, at which time 
rounded the applicant, some ill feelings 
part of WQkeraon developed; and that 
aboutjfive days prior to said shooting the sp-
in company with his brother-in-law, 
went by automobile one night to the Loveland 
Roth waa staying and called Roth 
*at of the houae; that Roth went out to the 
4er* that applicant demanded of Roth to tell 
his stfll waa; that Both denied 
r of its wheeeeboata, whereupon appli-
F i to abase Roth and throw missiles at 
aim, one of weir* struck him on the shoulder, aa 
* result of which Roth's arm waa partly c*a> 
attends* the time of the hearing of thia 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
(tee p.) 271 
*Fj*/jriew of the forogoiag facta, the comnris* 
efodt* that J. Lam WOkeraoa waa in-
July 20,1987, by being ahot bj* Prank 
kt the time and pice alleged in the ap-
, — J m ; that Rath, who inflicted the j injury, 
waa althird party; and that the injury fas not 
applicant because of hie employ* 
that it reaaitad from causae entirely 
apart from hie onmloymont and 
i of a personal grievance e£ 
Both, and thai 
he 
[1] While there la a conflict In the evidence 
aa to aomh of the facta found by the commis-
sion, tM findings, In our opinion* are amply 
sustained] There ia evidence to the effect 
that when the grader and the car met on the 
highway both were on the same aide of the 
road; that Wilkeraon turned hie horsea to 
the right Sobetructing the entire width of the 
road so that the car could not paaa on either 
aide; thai he dropped the rein* of the horses, 
descended from the grader and went to the 
aide of the car where Roth aat in the front 
eeat and commenced to fight him; that thia 
continued! until Roth obtained his gun, which 
waa undefr the eeat; timt Roth fired the gun 
either intentionally, or that It accidentally 
went off In the scuffle. It ia Immaterial for 
the porpoee of thia case whether It waa in-
tentional or accidental* The sole question here 
is, Waa the injury to Wilkeraon the reault of 
an accident arising In the couree of his em-
ployment? The foregoing la the substance of 
the evidence relating to the altercation, aa 
given by Mary Loveiand and Prank Roth. It 
appears also from the evidence that there 
waa ill feeling between Wilkeraon and Roth. 
The undisputed evidence show* that only a 
few day* before the occurrence hereinbefore 
detailed Wilkeraon went at night to the houae 
where Roth waa stopping and sent for Roth 
to come out to Wllkerson's car, and that 
Wilkeraon naked, MWhere la my still ;M that 
Roth said he did not know; that Wlllkerson 
called him a vile name and threatened'to kill 
him; that Wilkeraon Jumped out of the car 
and hit Roth with n^rock and continued to 
throw rocks at him until ^pth got into the 
houae; that Roth had not seen Wllke. ^ 
after that until they met on the 
Roth stated that the rock hit him j 
ahoul&er; and it waa not veil at 
of the hearing. Wilkeraon admitted 
had had trouble with Roth before. 
Both had been staying at hia houae i 
he left Wilkeraon lost a gun; that wh 
met Roth on the road he intended to 
him about the goat that ha had never 1 
chance before. WQkeraon denied that 
fought Roth when they met on the road, i 
Insisted that Roth ahot him without provoca-
tion. Be stated that ho tried t* take the can 
from Rojh but waa unsuccessful -• 
The foregoing la the substance of the evi-
dence tnjon which the oommiaskm based ita 
findings of fax* and conefnakme. 
[2] Tbfe Injury to Wilkeraon waa caused hy 
a third person concerning matters In no man-
ner connected with the employment The 
Industrial Act undertakes to protect the cm* 
ployee tit certain casee where the) injury la 
caused hy a third person, hot tt It only where 
the htjofrr k Inflicted heeane* of the empte* 
meal. Compiled Lawa TJtah 1MT> | SU* pro-
vide*: 
-The wards 'osteons! tefrry hy aortdatit aria-
lag « * * and ia the teniae at 
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be met I£ therefore, unlawful claims are; 
paid out of the fund the rate of premium* 
mutt necessarily be ralaed to the extent of 
such demands, and therefore any contribu-
tor may question the lawfulness of any 
award either In whole or in part Nor la It 
necessary under the statute that he contest 
the original application for compensation. 
He may assume that the commission will 
comply with the law. Indeed, in case an 
award is merely excessive and not wholly 
illegal, no one can complain until after the 
award is made and announced. The em* 
ployee who la permanently disabled and who 
is interested in having the insurance fund 
maintained is likewise interested not to have 
the fund depleted by any award which is 
either * holly or partially unauthorized by 
law. As a matter of course the degree or 
extent of the interest so long as It Is a sub-
stantial one is not material. Therefor^ either 
the contributing employer or the permanent* 
\y disabled employee may (tx the name of 
the insurance fund question the lawfulness of 
the award. Such is the manifest purpose 
of the statute, and, in view that it must be 
'lone In the same proceeding and within the 
time provided by statute, no one can be in 
Jured and no one can complain. If, however, 
the opinion as now written shall prevail to 
the effect that no one can defend an assault 
upon the insurance fund except the commis-
sion, ihe fund must necessarily go omlefend* 
rd in erery Instance where, as here, the com-
" mission has made an award payable out of 
that fund. As before pointed out the com-
mission has then already passed upon the 
lawfulness of the award, and hence even if 
it were possible for it in its own name to 
assail itself in this court it would not do so. 
and the fund would not and could not hare 
any defender. 
In this connection it may not be out of place 
to suggest that even in the absence Uf the 
enabling statute it would not be Irregular 
' to permit 'an Intereated party to question the 
unlawfulness of an award. The mere fact 
that the commission la made the administra-
tor and guardian thereof certainly cannot 
prevent one who is interested la it from de-
fending It There are many Instances where 
those whd are charged with the administra-
tion of a£ estate or a fund who by reason 
of some Act of theirs become adversely In-
terested dr hare by their conduct become im-
proper pefsone to defend the right* of the in* 
terested {forties* A familiar instance of that 
kind whick frequently occura arises where the 
directors and officers of a corporation who 
are charged with the duty of managing its 
affairs arid to protect its rlghta and the right* 
of the atbckhqldera by reason of their acta 
and conduct become disqualified from actio* 
In such event any stockholder or creditor who 
Is tntAfMM Mft In thm Bimi ftf thm M M M M . 
Uon obtain the proper relief in a court of 
Justice. Other instance* readily suggest 
themselves to the reader which need not be 
specially mentioned. The mere fact, there* 
fore, that the commission la made adminis-
trator and guardian of the fund is no ob-
stacle in the way of any one who I* interest* 
ed therein to defend i t The difficulty that 
presents Itself In this case, however, 1* that 
the attorneys who claim to appear in the 
name of the insurance fund and who assail 
the lawfulness of the award have shown no 
interest In the fund whatever. Having no 
interest they cannot be affected by the award, 
and hence cannot question it. As before 
stated, while the extent or degree of Interest 
is not material, yet there must at least be 
some substantial Interest, or the party com-
plaining here ha* and can have no standing 
in this court. In view, therefore, that the 
employer does not assail the lawfulness of 
the award, and in view that there is no one 
who la Interested In the insurance fond and 
hence haa the right to question the lawful-
ness of the award, is here complaining, the 
award should be affirmed. In that respect 
this case* however, does not differ from any 
other case where no good reason is made to 
appear why an award of the commission 
should not be affirmed. 
No valid cause being shown wherein the 
award Is not lawfuL it necessarily follows 
that it should be* affirmed, with costs, 
GARFF v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH. <Ne. 44080 
(Supreme Court of Utah* Jane 10, 1026.) 
Master ass4 senrsat «s»40S44). 
Evidence that deputy sheriff was not in 
performance of bis duties as officer at time of 
altercation and injury A«fd to support Indus-
trial Commission** finding denying compensa-
tion, in view of Comp, Law* 1017, f 3112, s* 
amended by Laws 1021, e* fi7. 
Action by A. Z. Garff to review an order of 
the Industrial Commission denying an award 
of compensation. Order of Commission af-
firmed. 
Holmgren. Anderson 4 Russell, of Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Harvey H. Oluff, Atty. Gem And J. Robert 
Robinson, AasL Atty, Gen., for defendant 
„ Gli>BUN. a J. TM* is an action to review 
an order of the Industrial Commission deny* 
lag the plaintiff, Garff, compensation. The 
commission made the following finding: 
"There is ae] question regarding the fact that 
applicant, Mr. Garff, and lflr. Vera Enais had a 
fight eti the tfta day of Hay, 1925, and as a 
result of said tight Mr. Garff was serioaefr fan 
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dat« of thl* assault there hidJbeen ill feelings | 
between Mr. Garff and Mr. Entile by reason of I 
Mr. GarTs eetray cattle gettinglato Mr. Ennla* 
pea patcb and doing damage. We find that Mr. 
Garff, on the 17th day of May! 1925 (Sunday), 
waa not attempting to arrest Mr. Emus for an 
alleged violation of the prohibition law. We 
find that the difficulty arose over a personal 
dispute between the applicant and Mr. Ennis, 
relating entirely to Mr. Qarffa cattle, and that 
the assault was occasioned bV personal eon-
troveray indulged In between Mr. Gsrff, the ap-
plicant and Mr. Ennis, and that, at the time Mr. 
Gsrff waa injured by reason [of said assault, 
he waa not in fact engaged in performing any 
duty for his-employer. Salt Lake County, t i l 
deputy sheriff/* 
From the foregoing finding the commission 
concluded that the Applicant Jvaa not entitled 
to compensation. 
It la insisted on the port of plaintiff before 
this court that there is no'competent sub* 
stantial evidence in the record to support the 
commission's finding. It la conceded that, if 
there is substantial competent evidence In 
the record to support the commission's find-
ings, this court ia powerless to review such 
finding. 
It appears that a fight occurred i>ctween 
Garff and Ennis on May 17,1025. It likewise 
appears these parties reside near each other 
at or near Draper, in Salt Lake county; that 
a few days prior to the 17th day of May, 
1925, Mr. GarfTs cattle had trespassed upon 
the premises of Mr. Ennis and had done some 
damage to his pea crop. 
It is the contention of plaintiff that he was 
a deputy sheriff on May 17,1025, and that he 
was attempting to make an arrest when he 
was assaulted by Ennis. He claims compen-
sation by reason of the fact that in the dis-
charge of his duties as deputy sheriff the as* 
sault was made and the injury resulted. He 
relies) upon subdivision 5 of section 3112, 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, as amended by chap-
ter 67, LAWS Utah 1021. That subdivision 
reads: 
"Hie words "personal injury by accident 
arising out of or In the coarse of employment* 
shall include an injury caused by the willful act 
of a third person directed againat an employee 
because of his employment • • •" 
The controversy and troulle between Mr. 
Garff and Mr. Bnnia took pilace In front of 
the tetter's home on the morning of May 17, 
1925. It appears that on the,'morning of that 
day Mr. Ennis and a Mr. Cosgrove drove from 
the village of Draper to Mr. Ennis* premises 
in separate automobiles. According to the 
testimony i f Mr. Ennla, hef had asked Mr. 
Cosgrove to assist him in lifting a colt from 
a ditch into which It had falieW Immediately 
after they kopped in front of the house and 
barn of Mr. Ennis, Mr. Garff came along in, 
his automobile, driving westward- It is the 
testimony of Mr. Garff that h* stopped there 
for the purpose of making in arrest of Mr. 
Ennis and his companion, that he had some 
reason to suspect'that Mr. Ennis was engaged 
in the bootlegging tfbalness, and that he was 
of the opinion that Mr. Ennis was st that 
time setting ready to make a delivery of in-
toxicating liquor to some one. Mr. Cosgrove 
testified that as Mr. Garff approached the car 
where Mr. Ennis was standing he said, "111 
have to place you boys' under arrest" Mr. 
Garff did not testify as to the language used, 
hut said he was attempting to make an arrest 
On the other hand, Mr. Ennis testified that as 
Mr. Garff approached him he made this state-
ment: "Tern Ennis, you dirty little bastard, 
you have got to take back everything you 
said to me out in the field or there will be 
trouble." It is not testified to by any one that 
anything further was said about an arrest 
after these introductory statements. Other 
witnesses testified that there was conversa-
tion between the parties,'but that they were 
not in such proximity to the participants as 
to be able to understand what was said. As 
a result of the fight, Mr. Garff was seriously 
injured, as found by the commission. 
The commission made no finding on the 
controverted issue as to whether the plaintiff, 
Mr. Garff, waa actually a deputy sheriff at 
the time in question or hot It la, however, 
fairly lnferam| from the commission's find-
ings tost the commission was of the opinion 
that the testimony was sufficient to support a 
finding that Garff was a deputy sheriff at 
that particular time. That, however, is fan* 
material, unless he received the injury by 
reason of "the willful act of a third person 
directed against" him "because of his employ-
ment" or by reason of his office. If the testi* 
mony of Mr. Ennis Is to be believed, then the 
plaintiff was not In the discharge of any duty 
imposed upon him by reason of his employ* 
ment • The plaintiff was either attempting to 
make an arrest at that time or he was not 
If he was not, he was not engaged In the per-
formance of his duties as a public officer, and 
therefore the accident or injury did not arise 
out of his employment or In the course of his 
employment Just what the plaintiff was at-
tempting to do must be determined from what 
was said and (lone by the parties at the time* 
Mr. Ennis, after stating what Mr. Garff aaid 
to him when he first approached the automo-
bile where Ekinls was standing, testified that 
he in reply- smld: "Welt my God, Aaron, I 
thought that was settled. You came to me 
and got your cows, and I thought that was 
settled." Later on this same witness testified 
that he said to Mr. Garff:. "This is no way to 
settle UiU; I didn't ceil you a thief.* Head-
so testified that la reply to what he said to 
Mr. Garff, Garff said; "Ton aneaklng little 
bastard," and with that struck Mr. Ennis In 
the mouth with his fist Tnls, Mr. Garff de-
nies this testimony, hut !» the face of the 
testimony given b* Mr. Amis, bo* can it rea-
sonably he defused* as In dainsed by counsel 
for ptoiutiff, that there ts no auhstsnttat erf 
. . .« . .•• mrnrwrni vuvtrict w i l t r e a t e d a s 
•Kur etaer ea«* »*• MUM topic and KKT-NUMBKR iu ^ |Uy*Humb#r«d DltmtM tad ladaaee 
MUf#rw*. U>nm*hout the e m t« R, i IS—«07 ehouUI a# R. & uMtl7. 
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lence to support the commission's finding} 
The only question of fact serious!/ contrtw 
rerted In the case was whether the plalntllt, 
Oarff, was risking or attempting to make an 
srrest by virtue of the fact that he was the*^ 
aud at that time a deputy sheriff. The test*, 
mony which we hare quoted was given to eni 
Labllsh what was said and done at the pertly 
alar time that Garff claims he was attempt-
luff to make an arrest The commission 
found that he was not In the discharge of hi , 
duties as an officer at that time. The commit* 
sion further found that the difficulty between 
the plaintiff and Mr. Ennle Was a person*} 
dispute relating entirely to GarlTs cattle 
having trespassed upon Ennis* growing crop%( 
and that the quarrel resulted from such tre*. 
pass, and that the assault was occasioned by 
a personal controversy. There can be n 0 
doubt that there Is substantial competent 
proof In the record to support the commit 
slon's findings. I t is useless to cite authors 
tie* /2Mf tb)s ivi?Tt Is rrltboot pt>wer t>r rJgkt 
to review findings of the commission If suc^ 
findings are supported by any competent, sutC 
stantlnl proof in the record. It Is likewise 
useless to consider the^cases which c o a n ^ 
for plaintiff cites discussing the question Of 
what is and whafc4a-not substantial evidence 
The testimony of what took place at the tlm^ 
of this troubte»turely cannot be considered a* 
without substance In attempting to prove an$ 
establish whether the plaintiff, Garff, wns s e t 
tling a personal grievance or was attempting 
to enforce the law. 
The order of the commission denying th* 
awardjs affirmed. 
THUBMAN, FRIOIL, 
STRAUP, JJn concur. 
uiiLiuu, ati* 
8TATE v. MERRITT. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. 
3. Larossy $ » ! • 
Erideace of receiving stole* goods know* 
tog them to have been so stolen does not sup-
port larceny charge. 
4» Larossy * a * 8 ( 3 ) . 
In prosecution for larceny «f sutomoblle, 
evidence ss to whether property had been re* 
cently stolen within Com* Laws 1917, | 8285, 
Md for Jury* 
5. Lareeay <t=>«8(3). 
In prosecution for larceny ef automobile, 
evidence hM not to explain possession of ac-
cused nnder Comp. Laws 1917,14285, as mat-
ter of law, but question to be for Jury.' 
6. Lareesy <*=»W 
Evidence Uid sufficient to sustain conviction 
for larceny of automobile. 
7. Crimiaal taw cs*23(IO)—tastrtetiea t i l l 
possession of property rsoestly stelea Is 
prima faeie evUeace ef stilt, la ahessoe sf 
MHIkrtory sxnJasaiJes, bald sot srrer, Is 
view ef other iastrsetloss (Camp* Laws »9!7f | 8285). 
Instruction, , under Comp. JMWM 1917, | 
8285, that poisession ef property recently stol-
en is deemed prims fade evidence of gmlt of 
larceny, in absence of satisfactory explanation, 
held not erroneous, in view of explanation by 
court of meaning and effect of statute so as to 
make dearer to jury that conviction must be 
on all evidence, and only when convinced of 
guilt beyond ressonsble doubt.' 
8. Criminal law *=>829(I5). 
Refusal of Instruction upon force ana enact 
of circumstantial evidence and Its proper con* 
•{deration by Jury **Jrf not error, where court 
correctly stated law thereon to extent that se-
cured was-entitled. 
I. Criminal law *»968(4) 
Jurisdictional question in criminal prose. fWCftaiMtar 
cutlon is properly raised by motion^ kxfafi*tf ' *ti—-Ji — 
Judgment. 
2. indict meat sad Intormailea <$•£$*,-5 t<2) - j 
Depsty district attiraey la « ^ | * * £ * b L^tiginieitt of error. 
Information, and Mi ileslSf as> s S s f r t f l ^ t t t r ^ f ^ 
aey Is mere Iri^siarity, W t lsva|ls*ari^r l«% 
formation (Coma. Laws 191)1 U 57«r,*7*V 
j In view of CompjLaws lTOT^H &JZ*TO 
8811, 8878, deputy district aitorn>?y la autnorl 
ised to subscribe end He inforataieu, notwitlaC 
standing sections 5761, 5763, and 877% and ni* 
signing as district attorney Is mere trreguUri„*| 
ty, which doss not invalidate Information:* 
9. Criminal law *$»5S2(3). 
To warrant conviction, circumstantial ari-
dence must convince jury beyond reasonmble 
doubt that all facts and circumstances are true, 
• and surit incompatible with any reasonable hy-
fpatWaother thin guilt of accused. 
* State v„ Badde, IS 
Murray. It tftaa. m, 
Uuh.X7f.MP. U1S; 
l it P. S8S. 
m. «* r. is; BUU $ 
Alleged error la failure "to instruct cmi-
cerning good character of accused under evi* 
4$&ce cannot be considered, where no such fa* 
struction waa requested nor question raised by 
*f, Criminal law «3=»9gg(S)-ftef*saJ ef 
> trial, seagirt seen afleaVtts relating ttf 
- Jy dissevered evidanee ef aliW, bet* mat, 
'; ef elseretiea, la view ef eesster cMaHtsu 
/~V<iMonel of new trials sought upon aflda* 
vita relating to newty discovered evidence* seek* 
ing to establish, alibi which did not occur to ac« 
cuSedf until after trial, h*U not abuse e l dis-
ctatieai In view of cetmjtar affidavits eontr*-
<jlcting alibi theory. 
or etaer eases aaeaatseJMmt and atMT-
< Sgtata v, OmtTetes, « Vt& HV* T. ISIS; IU-
tlagiilsalsg 9Ute v. Foully m TJIalu eX US K ISSt, 
*l|MUe «* Banwtta* Sf UtaX m. m *. UL 
